Yesterday, I heard Mr. Pahlavi’s speech at the National press club, issuing warning to those “who stay silent, beware.” Well, that is a splendid contradiction if there ever was one. It sadly reminds me of his father’s warnings to those who refused to join his one party dictatorship over a quarter of century ago. And lest we forget, the Shah’s Rastakhiz theatrics was dressed in the language of democracy. One only hopes there is nothing genetic about the inherited behavior.

Democracy as one said is the counting of heads instead of breaking them, and when Mr. Pahlavi warns the “silent ones” that “people will never forget that,” there is but one conclusion to draw, that is, a black list already being drawn somewhere for “pay back” after Mr. Pahlavi’s much desired democratic revolution installs itself.

Add to this the anecdotal reference by Mr. Pahlavi in his speech to Anatoli Sharansky, Russian refusnik-turned Israeli hawkish politician lubricating Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s war machine’s diplomacy. Reverence for democracy while idolizing an illiberal figure, who balks at the idea of a homeland for the Palestinians, does not quite sound consistent, and Mr. Pahlavi has a bit of explaining to do about that.

This brings me to a consideration of the validity basis of Mr. Pahlavi’s democratic pretensions, the fact that on the one hand he claims to stand for true pluralism in Iran, and yet, on the other hand, is quick to brand any one who sides with Khatami and his reform movement as falling into a “good cop, bad cop” gimmick. This raises the question: what about those groups and individuals who favor an Islamic democracy and disagree with his motto of a democratic republic? Would Mr. Pahlavi really submit to their will if there is a referendum in Iran at some point in the future and the majority turns down his model in favor of the Islamist model?

Contrary to what we may like to believe, there is no evidence that the majority of Iranian people actually prefer a straightforward democracy, nor can we simply extrapolate that since it is in their interests they must by necessity have such a preference. Mr. Pahlavi has been making this argument ad infinitum, together with the twin argument that the revolution has been hijacked by the theocrats in Iran.

Now my purpose is not to shield the ruling clergy and to defend their record, only to point out that the present behavior of Mr. Pahlavi leaves a lot to be desired. A genuine democrat would respect the right of citizens to remain silent instead of chastising them. Besides, what is so wrong with political quietism?

Mr. Pahlavi’s immediate answer would, logically speaking by inferring from his past behavior, run along this line: people should speak out, deliberate, and protest in the streets in order to topple the present regime that he, along with Mr. Bush, calls evil. Save the country, protest and survive, or rather evolve.

Two cheers for the heroics, but then again the question pops out: what is so wrong with political quietism? After all, in the U.S. itself, a majority sits at home on the presidential elections day, and most political scientists, including my deceased colleague Murray Levin, attribute this to voter alienation and apathy. But as Levin presciently pointed out in his classic, the Alienated Voter, citizens’ silence is not merely a sign of apathy but also dissent, that is, it reflects a passive form of protest or resistance.

Are there any advantages to passive resistance in Iran today? Not if you ask Mr. Pahlavi who likes to see the entire population on the march again, thus fully recycling the paradigm of “heroic society,” to borrow a term from the philosopher McIntyre, albeit with a secularist and royalist twist. And why not, Iran’s students have imploded again, as they typically do in their periodic wave of protest. But does it mean we are moving toward “another revolution” as many Western commentators and political dissidents like Mr. Pahlavi would have us believe?

The answer, to the extent that we can forecast based on an objective reading of the total situation, is negative, barring unforeseen circumstances such as continuing political and judicial blunders by the ruling elite like the one on Hashem Aghajari and the pollsters. So far, the republican theocracy has demonstrated a good deal of flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances and there is no reason to expect otherwise. There is enough democratic accountability, through the Majlis, the press, and the presidency, to siphon off the explosiveness of current milieu, and it is simply wrong to overlook the semi-democratic institutional features of the state. A qualitative leap forward may be necessary, but this is potentially held hostage by the burning national security concerns caused by the U.S. Superpower in the region. Hopefully there will be no war in Iraq that would cause the Iranian system to tighten up and, perhaps, clamp down on the democratizing movement. If that happens, Mr. Pahlavi may have a greater justification for issuing his warning mentioned above.

Yet, the Khatami omnibus of reform has not quite been punctured yet and this Mr. Pahlavi strongly seeks to see otherwise. He may be overlooking that there is a silent majority in Iran that favors the end of student demonstrations, the release of those arrested recently, the resumption of debates on Khatami’s proposed institutional reforms, and the preparations for the upcoming Majlis elections. The political dice has little likelihood of turning in the direction forecasted by Mr. Pahlavi, and his warning may be revealing of the difficulty of turning the wheel of royalist elitism to popular democracy, no matter what the discrete charm of palace bourgeoisie.