By: Fareed Marjaee
Daavar2@yahoo.com
On the anniversary of the 22nd of Bahman
”...but they won’t move; they’ll torment the nation, but they won’t budge. Thrown out one door, they sneak in through another; kicked down the stairs, they begin to crawl back up. They will excuse themselves, bow and scrape, lie and simper, provided they can stay--or provided they can return.” Ryszard Kapuscinski, “SHAH OF SHAHS,” Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, P. 119
As Iran is presently moving to strengthen its civil society and achieve Democracy, it has two distinct legacies to work with--two specific role models. There is the Mosaddegh era mobilization of Democratic institutions; and, the Pahlavi dictatorship, Coup, repression and corruption. The current political and cultural process needs historical references that are appropriate to the concepts of Democracy, pluralism and the politics-of-inclusion.
Is Reza Pahlavi the son of his father? Is he responsible for the sins of his father and grandfather? No, absolutely not; they are different individuals. But, in the same manner speaking, he cannot expect a free ride to power or spokesmanship for his mere association to the “royalty” or “monarchy” (especially, the monarchy that had credibility problems with respect to Democracy). He cannot have it both ways. The jury on that dictatorship was out in 1953 and again in 1979; although, in ’53 they could step outside the rules of the game and the bayonet...., with some support from Democracy-Assistance-Organizations from abroad (read AJAX).
What qualifies Reza Pahlavi to be the leader of Democratic change in Iran (note the word Democratic)? Is name-recognition the adequate qualification? Is he looking to occupy the seat of power? What sort of credentials does he bring to the democracy-table? What sort of a report card and curriculum-vita does he have for democracy work? Reza Pahlavi, just like any other citizen, can join the march to Democracy and like others can contribute based on his own merits--his Democratic political conduct and utterances. “Democracy advocacy” needs specific commitment and credentials. Shouldn’t his utterance in the form of statements explicitly repudiate the anti-democratic nature of the Pahlavi dictatorship? We should not underestimate the redemptive power of clearing the air. Citizen Pahlavi should rehabilitate the past and condemn the tyranny of the Pahlavi era and subversion of Democracy under that regime. Politics-of-exclusion is not an ingredient in the recipe for Democracy; it is the antidote. [For example, the current Reformist faction in Iran is taking convincing positions that indicate a sincere rehabilitation from the past, whereas previously they were co-opted by the principle of “Diktatory-e Solaha” or “Dictatorship of the Pious,” a phrase coined by Ayatollah Beheshti.]
On various occasions, Mohamad Reza Shah would explicitly express his disdain for the concepts of “Democracy” and “freedom of expression” (““The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution,” by Abbas Milani, Farsi Edition, P. 267). What is Reza Pahlavi’s unstated position vis-à-vis those views and sentiments? Even talks and pronouncements in themselves may not be enough. Note that when Mohamad Reza Pahlavi was installed to the throne by the British in 1320 _1941, the Shah explicitly acknowledged the past mistakes of his father and returned some of the land properties confiscated by his father to the government.
(As a despot, Reza Shah Pahlavi, besides killing and imprisoning political activists had another weakness--an insatiable appetite for ‘thy neighbor’s land;’ he would use his “Polis-e Siyasi” (Political Police) as a racketeer to confiscate other people’s land. Towards the end of Reza Shah’s reign, the income from “Amlake Saltanati,” [Royal Property Holdings] had exceeded the revenues of “Vezarate Dara’i” [the Treasury]. Yes, some converts of force and “modernization from the top” acquiesced. One intellectual, Taghizadeh, spoke of “diktatory-e monavvar” or “Dictatorship of the Enlightened.” However, the PRESENT context of democracy discourse and project, political legitimacy and mandate make such Faustian pacts meaningless). The point made here is that despite the earlier redemptive apologia, after Mohamad Reza Shah consolidated his power, he obliterated the polity, independent press and any form of political expression. And soon SAVAK was born (with some contribution from “Democracy-Assistance-Organizations” from abroad); huge commissions on armament purchases; and back to square one!
Next, to illustrate his commitment to Democracy since he speaks of referendums, Reza Pahlavi should abdicate the throne he is sworn to; does he (and his entourage) see himself as the lawful King? Well, where does the democratic mandate for his kingship come from? The most recent referendum was in the form of a painful and prolonged plebiscite from ’78 to ’79. In order to deescalate tensions between the US and Iran, the late Bazargan then head of the Provisional Government wrote a letter asking the Mohamad Reza Shah who was in the US to abdicate to make the job of his government easier in dealing with the charged atmosphere. The request was refused.
Furthermore, has Reza Pahlavi surrounded himself with individuals and political forces that are associated with the Democracy Movement in Iran? Up to now, he seems to have surrounded himself with remnants of the ancient regime, the Royalist Court entourage and the reactionary émigré circles, all of which would damage the credibility of his message. It is not an ambiguous or ephemeral issue when it comes to political actors on the ground in Iran with Democracy credentials and reputation; they are well recognized.
The National Front (Jebhe Melli), and Iran Freedom Movement have been on the scene for almost half a century; they have struggled for democracy in Iran before the 1953 Coup, after the Coup, before the 1979 Revolution and after the Revolution.
Last, but not least, Reza Pahlavi should abstain from meeting agents of a foreign government in the hope of being placed to the seat of power through some sort of “operation!” (see Mr. Ahmad Ansari’s books, “Man Va Khandan Pahlavi,” and “Man Va Reza”). One cannot help but to be reminded of the proverb that goes: there is no denying, the stolen rooster’s hind leg is all too visible.
In order to appreciate the more appropriate historical references for Democratic change, one has only to remember Dr. Mosaddegh’s uncompromising commitment to Democratic rights and rule of law. It was best symbolized in his very first act as Prime Minister by closing the press censorship office of “Shahrbani” and discharging its chief “Moharram Ali Khan,” first installed by Reza Shah Pahlavi. And, his very first executive order was directed to the police and carbon copy judiciary in order to reaffirm his policy that all citizens and journalists are free to criticize him and his government.
Mosaddegh and Bazargan’s legacy speaks of an anti-colonial and Democratic struggle--the language of the future; the Pahlavi legacy speaks of a dictatorial client-state, an instrument of hegemony--the language of the past. From Dr. Abbas Milani’s book (Ibid, P. 219) we learn that the Shah spoke in English or French language with his Prime Minister. Now, can Reza Pahlavi understand and respect the present Reformist language of the people and their aspiration for Democracy?
“They are bound in a struggle that admits of no compromise because it is the conflict between two principles: the autocracy of the Shah and the democracy of Mosaddegh” Ryszard Kapuscinski, “SHAH OF SHAHS,” Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, P. 31
Fareed Marjaee is an Urban Planner and researcher; previously, a member of the Executive Committee of the New Democratic Party of the City of Toronto.
Other articles by Fareed Marjaee:
An analysis of the Documentary "Anatomy of a Coup: The CIA in Iran"
and
Responses to John Silber's piece titled "Give Iran’s Sorry President no A
pologies"