Nearly five years have passed since Mohammad Khatami was elected with a landslide majority as Iran’s president. While his supporters dominate the parliament and he won a second presidential election with a wide margin, the hard-line conservatives control the judiciary and several other oversight institutions. They have thwarted many of Khatami’s efforts to make Iran a more democratic environment. As a result, some of President Khatami’s early supporters are now disillusioned and some have urged him to resign in protest. However, while he has failed to deliver on many of his campaign promises, the presence of Khatami and his supporters in the Iranian political scene has reduced the level of political repression compared to earlier periods.

While Iran still has a long way to achieving Western standards of political freedom, it is enjoying a less repressive political environment that is a byproduct of the ongoing power struggle between the conservative clergy and the reformist supporters of President Khatami. On many occasions over the past two years, the judiciary has tried to prosecute political activists and liberal journalists for remarks that were considered anti-regime or anti-Islamic. However, on each occasion, the liberal members of the Parliament and pro-reform political movements have actively and loudly protested the arrests and prison terms. On several occasions, these protests have forced the judiciary to modify its decision. A good example is the arrest of a liberal MP (Hossein Loghmanian) in December 2001, who was accused by the judiciary of insulting the Islamic regime. In response to his arrest, a large number of MPs wrote a letter of protest to the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, and declared the arrest unconstitutional. The protest led to a constitutional crisis with some MPs threatening to resign. The dispute was finally resolved when the supreme leader intervened and pardoned the MP.

More recently, another MP (Seyed Hashem Aghajari) was summoned to court for sharply criticizing the role of clergy in Shiite Islam and calling for religious reforms similar to the Protestant movement in Christianity. If he had made these remarks six years ago, he could have been subject to torture and possibly a summary execution. But in the new environment, he was summoned for a court appearance. While conservative clerics called for his severe punishment, a major pro-reform movement and several MPs openly supported him. Another recent example is the recent example is the protest and resignation of Ayatollah Taheri, Isfahan’s pro-reform Friday Prayer Leader. His sharp and candid criticism of corruption and political repression in the current regime drew strong support from the reform movement and sharp condemnation from the conservatives. While in the past such a political maneuver by a clergy could have resulted in his explosion from the clerical ranks and at the very least house arrest, Ayatollah Taheri’s remarks resulted in a conciliatory response from Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader who agreed with many of his criticisms. This is yet another reflection of Iran’s new political environment.

These expressions of political dissent have become more frequent in recent months. It now appears that political activists are more willing to test the limits of political opposition and break their silence on topics previously considered political taboos. An important reason for this phenomenon is that the hardliners have lost control of the parliament and print media. The judiciary’s repeated attempts to suppress the liberal newspapers have been unsuccessful. While the conservative courts have shot down dozens of journals, the pro-reform ministry of Islamic guidance has issued licenses for new ones. Closure of one publication is frequently followed by the appearance of a new one with a similar political agenda. As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult for hardliners to suppress their political opponents. Hence from a political activist’s point of view, the expected punishment for opposing the conservatives has diminished. Instead of torture and summary execution or disappearance, he is now entitled to a trial and will most likely receive political support from the liberal and reform-oriented organizations. If he is sentenced to a prison term, it usually is for no more than a few years with a high probability of a pardon.

Such an environment is certain to invite more political activism and the pace of political opposition to the hardliners would accelerate over the next few months. Within the reform movement, there are already calls for a national referendum on critical issues such as the role of supreme leader and the Guardian Council, which enjoys veto power over the Parliament. There is also a strong possibility that secular individuals would become more vocal and make new cultural demands. They might call for religious freedom and the separation of church and state. The conservatives frequently warn reformers about the threat of seculars to the entire Islamic regime. They accuse the reformers of unintentionally paving the way for the empowerment of these secular forces.

As the political opposition intensifies the danger of a backlash by the hardliners will also increase. Well aware of their low popularity, the hardliners might worry about their political survival and resort to extreme measures, such as martial rule and dissolution of the parliament. Alternatively, fear of a secular uprising might motivate the conservatives to enter into a power-sharing arrangement with the reform movement at the expense of seculars. Uncertain and critical times lie ahead for Iran.