In the post Cold War milieu, both geopolitically and geoeconomically, Iran is considered an important actor, notwithstanding its unique location straddled between two energy rich regions, namely, Central Asia-Caucasus and Persian Gulf. While the geographic and external geostrategic considerations matter, the determination of exact role and importance of Iran is a consequence of Iran’s own game(s) of strategy in both regions.

So far, Iran has pursued a broad policy of good neighborly relations within the purview of a sophisticated, nuanced approach cognizant of each region’s economic and security calculus. In essence, this has translated into a melange of parallel and overlapping bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral initiatives aimed at securing Iran’s national interests in both regions and tackling the challenges of cooperation.

Thus, whereas Iran’s Persian Gulf policy has focused on bilateral cooperation with various [P] Gulf Cooperation Council (PGGC) states such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, in Central Asia on the other hand, Iran has given preference to multilateral cooperation through the Economic Cooperation Council (ECO). Moreover, while Iran has increasingly been inclined to enter security cooperation with certain PGCC states, its ECO policy remains focused on the economic dimension.

Yet, there are signs that this nuanced approach, which treats the two key ‘orbits’ of Iran’s foreign policy as discrete regions, may be changing in favor a new pan regional approach aimed at creating organic linkages between Central Asia-Caspian Sea region and Persian Gulf. The new approach-in-the-making is the direct result of evolution of Iran’s inter-regional policy of the 1990s, as well as of the complex configuration of bi-regional issues, such as the so-called pipeline geopolitics.

Concerning the latter, Iran’s equidistance from both regions is a transparent blessing inducing Iran’s collaborative preferences vis-a-vis the PGCC states and Central Asian-Caucasian states. That Iran can be a suitable conduit for future transactions between these two sets of states can be garnered from the fact that the Persian Gulf states are increasingly interested in the energy market of Central Asia-Caucasus. Case in point, Delta Oil Company of Saudi Arabia is already very active in exploitation projects in Azerbaijan. Much as Saudis and other PGCC states may dread the future ability of Central Asian oil to undermine OPEC’s position in the world oil market, such a fear is for the foreseeable future kept to a minimum by the realization that (a) the proven oil reserves in the Caspian oil region is substantially much smaller than that of Persian Gulf (15 to 20 billion barrels compared to roughly 670 billion barrels respectively), and (b) the world’s oil consumption is sufficiently growing in pace with the supply.

Increasingly, the PGCC states have concluded that their prominent capital assets can be invested in the Caspian Sea region, that they can draw on the human capital of this region for their future development, and that Iran can be a constructive partner in their pursuit of these objectives, e.g., a joint Iran-Saudi pipeline (1). Inversely, the PGCC states’ interest in their “sister” region is security-based, for there are definite risks to their security well-being posed by the spill-over of insecurity from Central Asia-Caucasus to, say, Iran. Since instability in Iran spells trouble for its Persian Gulf neighbors, the latter are logically inclined to offset the external sources of such instability potentially emanating from Central Asia, e.g., ethnic irredentism. By the same token, the PGCC states must realize an important incentive of a Central Asia-Iran pipeline to Persian Gulf: it enhances Iran’s status quo preferences.

Thus, Iran derives strength from the interaction of fears and opportunities of its neighbors in both these regions. Iran’s ECO-based cooperation has compensated for its “credibility deficits” with respect to the PGCC, and its current infatuation with the “pipeline geopolitics” entail intra-regional bargaining. The pipeline controversy, for example, has triggered the issue of “securitization of oil policy” which, in turn, requires closing the gap between OPEC and Caspian Sea oil and broadening the PGCC’s security concept --- the very term “regional security” is politically and historically constructed, and the new environment calls for the construction of a new, and broader approach encompassing both regions. This, in turn, requires overcoming the PGCC ‘s “security neurosis” of viewing Iran as a “Security outsider.”

Iran’s emerging pan-regional approach is, on the other hand, a timely response to the complex necessities of the new bi-regional context, which dictates the reconstruction of its hitherto two-track regional diplomacy in favor of a “linkage diplomacy” in pursuit of a Pan-Persian Gulf-central Asia overall project. The challenge for Iran is fulfilling its projected image as gateway to Central Asia for Persian Gulf states, and vice versa, while protecting itself from some of the unintended consequences of “open regionalism,” such as trade disputes, etc. Without doubt, however, the time to bracket Iran’s bifurcated regionalism in favor of pan-regionalism has fully arrived.

About the author:
Dr. Kaveh Afrasiabi is the author os "After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran’s Foreign Policy."