At long last the UN resolution on Iraq has been unanimously adopted at the Security Council, and now the Iranian government must seriously weigh its options ranging from fully to tacitly supporting the UN resolution calling for Iraq's full compliance with the world community's demand for disarmament, dating back to the 1991 Kuwait crisis, to neutrality to overt or covert opposition to the looming prospect of a U.S.-led war in case Saddam Hussein fails to heed the UN's warning.

So far, Iranian leadership has tuned its diplomacy to different tunes and a whole panoply of voices beating the drums of cooperation and opposition to U.S.'s anti-Saddam agenda channeled through the UN can be heard. Both the hawks and doves of Iranian politics have song in unison the drum beat of preventive diplomacy aimed at preventing yet another deadly warfare in the Persian Gulf region, notwithstanding the recent tour of the region by Iran's Interior Minister, Mr. Younesi, who articulated to the leadership in Damascus, among others, Iran's "active neutrality" much as it is simultaneously tilted against both Iraq and the United States. The former president and current head of the Expediency Council, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, at his Friday prayer sermon in early October, reiterated Iran's "complete neutrality" in the event of a U.S.-Iraq war, this to dispel any hope on the part of Iraq that Iran may be swayed in its direction and thus dissuade Washington from initiating the war.

A clue to the lack of a "groupthink" in Iran on this matter, President Khatami in his trip to Turkey in early October, used the opportunity of his press conference with his Turkish counterpart, to make a tough stand against U.S.'s war plans against Iraq, and repeated the same posture at his more recent official visit to Spain, much to the chagrin of Spain's president, Aznar, who showed his displeasure with the Iranian position by skipping the farewell ceremony for President Khatami under the excuse of a council of ministers.

What is most important about the Iranian government's position, however, is the statement by Foreign Minister Kharrazi, at his press interview in Tehran with the Swiss foreign minister, nearly three weeks ago, which contained both positive sentiments toward the Bush Administration and its reported reconsideration of Iran's place in the "axis of evil" as well as explicit Iranian willingness to abide by the will of the United Nations on Iraq. Dr. Kharrazi has repeatedly expressed the same position since then in his public statements -- in Spain and elsewhere.

However, it is noteworthy that the present UN resolution, while giving Saddam Hussein a final warning and explicitly accusing him of "material breech" of his commitment to disarm, nonetheless is a few steps short of sanctioning the use of force in the event of Saddam's non-compliance, in which case a follow-up resolution might be necessary. Henceforth, Iran has a precious few weeks to spin its "preventive diplomacy" further into action, with both sides I hasten to add, in the light of the current trip of Iran's Commerce Minister to Iraq and the previous trip of Iraq's Foreign Minister, Mr. Naji Sabri to Tehran, following the visit to Tehran by the British foreign Minister, Mr. Jack Straw; at his last press conference in Tehran, Dr. Kharrazi admitted that Mr. Straw carried a positive message from Washington.

This brings us to the issue of U.S.-Iran diplomacy presently deadlocked over various issues ranging from Iran's pro-Palestine stance to sanctions, etc. Iran's national security interests militate against any prospect of a pro-U.S. belt around it and that explains the inability of West European middlemen to solicit Iran's cooperation with Washington's war plans irrespective of Washington's warm signals. Perhpas bigger and more meaningful carrots, such as the promise for gradual lifting of sanctions, are needed before Iran's cooperation can be found forthcoming. Symbolic yet publicly effective gestures such as backing away from singling out Iranians in America for "extra screening" through finger prints and so on, may help as well.

Yet on a broader level, any Iranian cohort with the U.S. on Iraq depends first and foremost on U.S.'s guarantee of its good intentions, i.e., assuring Iran that division of Iraq and parceling Kerkuk to Turkey and or an independent Kurdish state is not in in the cards. Here, the question is can Iran trust the U.S. if any such guarantee is given through private channels? After all, Iranians, particularly Iran's strongman, Mr. Rafsanjani, have vivid memory of how the senior Bush reneged on his promise of "good will begets good will" when he failed to reciprocate Iran's cooperation with the release of Western hostages in Lebanon, an issue extensively dealt with by Mr. Giandomenico Picco, a former U.N. diplomat, in his book, Man Without A Gun (New York Times Publication, 2000).

Henceforth, history should not repeat itself and Iran cannot rely exclusively on private messages and assurances that can be discarded by a future leader in the White House. Nor, can it afford to request a public statement of guarantee from Washington, in the light of Iran's regional sensitivities, above all toward the Arab world, not to mention Iran's domestic constituency. The best option, it seems, is a mix of private and public messages and signals aimed at building bridges of confidence between the two sides with their horns locked at each other since 1979. Fortunately, as in Afghanistan, the area of mutual or converged interests is large enough to move both governments in the direction of security dialogue over the fate of Iran's unruly neighbor, Iraq.

An important prerequisite for this (potential) dialogue, however, is Washington's recognition that Iran's feelings over Afghanistan remain partially bruised, as the predominant sentiment in Tehran is that it was rewarded for its cooperation against Taliban and Al-Qaeda by Bush's "axis of evil." This needs to be addressed before any tangible progress on Iraq can be anticipated.