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By Amir Ali Nourbakhsh - Editor
Iran
Focus MAY 2004 (ORDIBEHESHT-KHORDAD 1383), VOL 17 NO 6
This article
is from the political-economic monthly IRAN FOCUS, published by the UK based
Menas Associates. For more on Menas Associates please visit www.menas.co.uk.
Late in May,
CIA sources reported that the Iraqi National Congress (INC) had passed
classified information to Iran. The finger of suspicion was pointed at Ahmad
Chalabi. Since he was once a US
favorite, many had thought that he would emerge as Iraq’s next
leader.
Chalabi says he has come under suspicion because of his recent
open criticism of Washington’s plans to transfer power to the Iraqi people at
the end of June.
The CIA asserts that it has “hard evidence” that Chalabi
and his intelligence chief, Aras Karim Habib, passed US secrets to Tehran. The
accusations hold too that Habib, a Shia Kurd, was all along a paid Iranian agent
who passed intelligence in both directions.
Habib, who is being sought
by Iraqi police, has been Chalabi’s right-hand man for more than a decade.
Apparently, he was in charge of a Pentagon-funded intelligence collection
programme in the run-up to the attacks on Iraq. The Baghdad headquarters of
Chalabi has been raided. Now Chalabi’s lawyers have written to Paul Bremer, the
US administrator of Iraq, condemning the raid and demanding financial
restitution.
Iran Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi described
the allegations as baseless. “We have not received any classified information,
either from Chalabi or any member of the Iraqi Governing Council,” he said.
A new US concern or a pretext to pressure Iran?
The first
question that comes to mind here is whether the Chalabi affair is based on
genuine US concerns or is designed to provide the Washington hawks with another
foreign policy instrument against Tehran.
Irrespective of whether or not
the new accusations are well founded, it is necessary to ask what precipitates
the US to admit to or claim such a stab in the back from its 25-year adversary?
If the claim is a false one, what intention lies behind this policy?
And
if the US is genuinely convinced of the accusations, what precipitates the US to
belittle itself to such an extent – admitting that it has been fooled by
Iran?
Scenario 1 The US
is using Chalabi to pressure Iran
Should the whole
Chalabi case be found to be a set-up or even an exaggeration of a minor
predicament it will signify that the American neo-conservatives are still on the
rise. Some analysts argue that even if that were the case, the hawkish US
attitude in its foreign policy would diminish once the neo-cons were voted out
by the American nation, theoretically next November. This argument is not
necessarily correct. The following points offer
clarification:
- First, the question of hard line or soft line in US
foreign policy is not specific to party politics. There are Democrat politicians
who are as tough on US foreign affairs as current Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld. Pentagon hawks such as Paul Wolfowitz served under Democrat President
Jimmy Carter. Also, neo-cons Henry Jackson and Richard Perle were Democrats. In
other words, there has been a hardline mindset all along among Democrats since
the late 1970s.
The Democrat administration of Bill Clinton also embarked on
the Pentagon’s hawkish new Defense Planning Guidance that Zalmey Khalilzad (an
originally Pashtun American, hostile to the Islamic Republic) had prepared under
Wolfowitz in 1992. Moreover, it was the Clinton administration that distanced
itself from the UN and the concept of collective security, which eventually led
to the military intervention in Somalia in 1993, and also in Kosovo, without UN
approval. Hence, the attitude of a Democrat administration under John Kerry, if
he is elected, will very much depend on the line-up of his team, which is still
unclear.
- Secondly, since
11 September, it has become very difficult to draw a clear line between foreign
policy objectives of even the most dovish of Democrats and the most hawkish of
the Republicans. The central objective is national security and combating
terrorism, which both Democrats and Republicans relate to Iran.
The difference will
merely lie in the strategies used to deal with the perceived problem. Hence,
Democrats might change the “regime change” discourse against Iran but will
definitely not give any concessions before Washington’s requirements are met by
Iran. Under the current domestic political realities, it is highly unlikely that
Iran will address US concerns. Even if there was a will among some Iranian
conservatives to cooperate with Washington, the domestic situation in Iran would
not allow such a détente with the US.
- Thirdly, US foreign policy
has always been determined by a variety of institutions and mindsets. Apart from
the White House, the Congress and the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA
and powerful lobbies have especially in the past decade set the tone for the
pro-hawkish US attitude vis-à-vis “rogue states” such as Iran. It is unthinkable
to assume that the Pentagon, the CIA or the American Israeli Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC) would favor a détente with Tehran under the given
circumstances. Now, with the departure of the Democrat George Tenet from the
CIA, the agency’s attitude might even turn out to become more aggressive towards
Iran.
Also, given the chaos that the US created in Iraq, Washington feels
the need to psychologically distance itself from responsibility there. The US
search for a scapegoat leaves, according to Middle East expert Professor Fred
Halliday of the London School of Economics, three possible candidates: Iran,
Israel and Turkey. Considering Turkey’s and Israel’s good relations with
Washington, Iran provides the best choice.
All said, using Chalabi as a
means of leverage against Iran should not be read only as the US
administration’s new initiative to plunge into the role of the victim, instead
of the villain. This will have severe consequences for Iran if US foreign
policies do not fail as they did in Iraq. To put the blame on Iran would not
only release the hawks from a considerable amount of international and domestic
pressure, but would also further weaken a long-time enemy like Iran. This is in
harmony with the policy that the US has been pursuing for some time
already.
Theoretically, the new accusations could keep Tehran under
constant US pressure, even if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
board of governors were to decide on 14 June to acquit Iran of US accusations
that it has been developing weapons of mass destruction. In fact, all
indications are that Iran will suffer more pressure from the international
community with regard to its nuclear dilemma in the weeks to come.
The
Chalabi case could adversely affect the reputation of a country like Iran which
has already suffered under the spotlight of US negative public relations. Any
deterioration of Iran’s reputation, which only recovered under President
Mohammad Khatami, would benefit the hawks, who have an ideological stake in
antagonizing Iran.
US neo-cons, given their current good relations with
Tel Aviv, will have a lot to lose if the way is paved for a rapprochement
between Tehran and Washington. First, a reconciliation would endanger the
projected oil pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Ceyhan, Turkey, which has been
favored so much by Tel Aviv. International oil firms that operate in the Caspian
Sea region would push for a shorter and cheaper pipeline route – through Iran –
to salt water, that is, against the interest of the US allies. Secondly,
Israel’s quest for the waters of Lebanon’s Litani River will be jeopardized, as
Iran’s support for the Lebanese Hezbollah has made that very difficult. Thirdly,
the US hawks will be deprived of one of their main enemies; something that the
world’s lone superpower could barely afford in the post-Cold War setting, at
least according to the mindset of the neo-cons.
Scenario 2 The
US’s genuine concerns will prompt genuine action
Should Washington
be seriously concerned about Iran having fooled the US intelligence apparatus,
the collision course will certainly be prolonged. If Washington was heretofore
concerned only about Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, its disruptions of the
Middle East Peace Process, its support of terrorism and violations of human
rights, now the ruling circles in Washington are also worried about Iran’s
active intelligence and counter-espionage capabilities. The US presence in Iraq
and Afghanistan will certainly make this much more of an issue.
Such
considerations will have their own consequences. First, the US needs to keep the
EU on its side. Never before in the past seven years – since Khatami was elected
president in 1997 – have the Europeans been so cooperative with the US against
Iran. The reasons for this are the failure of the EU’s engagement policies with
Iran, Tehran’s repeated lack of commitment to the IAEA and generally the fact
that Iran has not cooperated with the international community to the extent that
the US expected and the EU promised.
Another case of “Iranian deception”
– the Chalabi case – especially against the Coalition Forces, where the EU is
also a key stakeholder, would make a return to Iran-friendly policies for the EU
very difficult. By the same token, the mutual US–EU security concerns after 11
September will make European business with Iran – which has always been frowned
upon in Washington – ever harder.
The Europeans will find it difficult to
argue in favor of bilateral trade relations with Iran if the US provides “hard
evidence” that Tehran has been deceiving the Americans and Europeans in
Iraq.
This is especially the case if the leaking information is connected
to the sensitive issue of hideouts for nuclear weapons. According to the New
York Times, Tehran sent a bogus message to Baghdad purportedly disclosing the
location of an important weapons site in an apparent attempt to test whether
what they were hearing was true.
Conclusion
This article has
attempted to show that irrespective of the motives that lie behind the new US
allegations against Tehran, the consequence will be more animosity. An end to
the collision course between Iran and the US in the foreseeable future would be
possible only if the neo-cons were to lose to a moderate Democrat party in
November, provided the Democrats changed their foreign policy objectives
completely. So far there are no signs that the Democrats would pursue friendlier
policies with Iran. Indeed, if the Democrats win, the world might witness the
birth of a new generation of hawkish Democrats.
By the same token, the
rise of the conservatives to the corridors of power in Tehran makes a
rapprochement ever more difficult. Although many have speculated that the
conservatives, once in power in Tehran, would immediately establish ties with
the US, hitherto the stances of conservative MPs, their death slogans directed
against the US, and hostile Friday Prayer sermons are not providing any such
signposts.
What can, however, be said about Tehran–Washington relations
is that the Chalabi case does not only point at a tougher US stance on Iran. It
also indicates that if the hawkish mindset survives the next election, and until
then, the US will try harder to change the regime in Tehran.
The
decision-making process and the factional struggles aside, the US faces a
difficult challenge that the Iraq lesson might have even proven to be
impossible. Iran is a sovereign and not a failed or weak state as some hawks
insisted about Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran is three times larger and more
populous than Iraq, which would makes it all the more difficult to invade. The
Islamic Republic is a growing and stable economy with growing international
business links. Despite obstacles to foreign direct investment, inflows to
certain sectors are gradually improving, if not booming.
Iran, with or
without nuclear power, can deter and attack Israel using its Shahab-3 ballistic
missiles, if push comes to shove. An American or Israeli pre-emptive strike to
prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran could provoke retaliation by Tehran in an
asymmetric or non-conventional manner. Also, if a strike on Iran’s nuclear sites
was to fail to fully destroy them, Tehran would be more encouraged to retaliate
with a nuclear bomb, if it is indeed close to having the bomb, as the hawks
argue.
Moreover, it is almost certain that the US would not receive any
support in the UN Security Council, if it decided to attack Iran or even to
surgically target its nuclear sites. On top of that, the US sanction policies
against Iran have proved to be an abject failure.
On the other hand,
experts agree that the Islamic Republic is not only coup-proof, but that a
revolution – despite vast public discontent – is out of the question. The above
paradigm leaves a US determined to deal with Iran with just a few
options.
- Washington will
cooperate with Iran only if a unified voice in Iran guarantees compliance and
cooperation with Washington. This is the most unlikely scenario.
- Washington
will try to move towards a more coercive approach with Iran. Given the arguments
in this article, this is also an unlikely outcome.
- The US will move
more in line with the EU foreign policy on Iran. This is the most likely
scenario, especially since the US has currently the necessary tools to intensify
the EU’s stance on Iran.
Signposts as to
whether the last outcome is likely are:
- continuation or deterioration of
EU’s tough stance on Iran;
- harsher stances from within the IAEA
vis-à-vis Tehran;
- a deterioration in Iran–EU economic relations, for
example, the further suspension of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between
Iran and Europe;
- intensified human rights discourse by EU member
states;
- further condemnation of the February election in Iran as
undemocratic by the EU and US, or discussions by Europeans on the legitimacy of
the new Majlis;
- The emergence of new or re-emergence of old human rights
issues that would undermine Iran’s relations with Europe, such as the Mykonos
affair.
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