By Hooshang Amirahmadi, Professor and
Director
Center for Middle East Studies, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ,
USA
It is time that Iranians take a closer look at the
relative position of their nation in the new world. How has the world changed
and where do they stand in relation to the changes? How do they compare to the
rest of the developing nations? What are the key problems the nation faces? What
needs to be done and how? “A Vision
for the Place of Iran in the New World” attempts to outline a few answers.
I am most unhappy to report that all is not well in Iran and that the
nation lacks a prestigious address in the emerging global community. Iran has
indeed become a P.O. Box nation in the new world.
The country faces a multiple of complex and challenging
problems. Iran is psychologically depressed, economically stagnant,
technological backward, politically undemocratic, socially ill and divided,
culturally confused, territorially imbalanced, and internationally demonized.
Iran today has no set direction and its leadership is without vision for a
modern future. It is no wonder that the young Iranians have trouble seeing a
prosperous Iran on the horizon.
I know these are disturbing statements, and I do not wish for a second to
impress upon you a pessimistic view of the future. The fact is the Iranian
nation does not deserve the miserable condition in which it lives today. Iran is
a country rich in people, history, culture, art, geography, and natural
resources. As the first empire builders, for centuries Iranians stood for the
historic East against the historic West and have been a pivot of
stability.
Today, a gap exists between Iran’s resources and its achievements. I dare
to say that Iran is indeed one of the lowest achievers in the world today
relative to its resources. Why so? It is certainly not because the nation has
not tried. It is now well over a century that the Iranian people have been
trying to close the gap and advance. They have used reform and revolution as
well as tens of theories, strategies and policies to achieve this. However, save
for some initial successes, they have been increasingly disappointed.
Why so, let me ask again? As a nation, Iranians do not
agree on the cause or the causes of their general undevelopment. Most Iranians
blame foreign powers; some condemn the ruling elite, and others hold a
combination of the two responsible. However, to me it is all about the lack of
vision and leadership, a subject to which I will shortly return.
The Global
Community and Iran
To better appreciate where Iran stands in relation to the
new world, it is important to understand what our world has become. While Iran
has been trying to take off from the land of undevelopment, the world it lived
in has flown into a post-modern community, better known as the land of
interdependencies or globalization. It is a land where a number of mega-trends
have become universal to the human condition. Such trends are evidenced in
economic, technological, ideological, political, spatial, ecological and
socio-cultural dimensions of human life -- trends whose management requires
global education, integration, and cooperation.
Nation-states, non-governmental organizations, and
transnational corporations are key power players in the new tri-centric world.
This is a world different from the Cold War mono-centric world when
nation-states were the only power centers. The United States dominates the new
world system, along with a few junior and senior partners, though it is
increasingly challenged for its desire and attempts to create and maintain a
unipolar world. The United Nations continues to remain a balancing force, but
its power to restrain powerful states from acting unilaterally is largely
reduced.
The most critical feature of this new
tri-centric world system is a built-in tension in its drive for simultaneous
stability and chaos. In particular,
the system is caught between two diametrically opposing tendencies, one calling
for integration and cooperation and the other creating conditions for
disintegration and conflict. Let us
call these influences world-integrating forces and world-disintegrating forces.
World-integrating forces include globalization of capital, and the global spread
of industrial productions, tertiary services, commodity markets, multi-sourcing,
mass consumption, popular culture, money, people and ideas.
World-disintegrating forces include asymmetrical
economic and technological development and competition among nation states, and
the growing power of the unrestrained transitional firms and non-state actors
such as NGOs and terrorist organizations. Isolationist nationalism or
traditionalism, cultural relativism and religious fundamentalism, global
disparity and polarization, political suppression in failed states, ethnic
autonomy demands, and economic regionalism and parochialism tend to exacerbate
world disintegration.
Among many ramifications of the
contradictory tendencies for integration and disintegration, one I believe is
pivotal for a new paradigm of global coexistence, namely the diminishing utility
of illegitimate power and offensive force, including militarism and violence,
and dogmatic ideologies, in gaining societal hegemony or maintaining popularly
undesirable status quo. Under the new condition, totalitarian and authoritarian
regimes are increasingly forced to accept democracy and human rights.
As the power of offensive force has
diminished, economic force and information technologies have become the most
effective means of influence and domination. Indeed, Japan and Germany have grown
into powerful international forces almost solely by means of their economic
strength and information-processing capabilities. As economics and information
emerge as new fields of force, economic development and information technologies
have become among major components of national defense strategy.
The diminishing utility of offensive force
has already led to a loosening of dogmatic ideologies and to negotiated
political transitions in many parts of the world, including Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union. A few
developing countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa with dictatorial regimes
have also experienced the method and others are expected to follow suit. This development has in turn become
critical for the promotion of democracy and development across the globe.
Governments are rethinking national industrial and trade
policies and most now favor direct foreign investment, export-oriented strategy,
high-technology development, and partnership with the private sector. Meanwhile, the idea of a balanced
pluralistic economy alongside the emerging political pluralism is gaining
increasing acceptability.
Where is the place of Iran in this new tri-centric
world? Naturally, Iran should have been a major regional integrationist force
given its vast and strategic geography and population. In reality, however, Iran
is only marginally influential in its region and is often seen as a
disintegrative force. The conflict with the United States and state theocracy
are key obstacles to Iran assuming a more active and effective role in various
regional matters. For example, Iran only plays a peripheral role in regional
conflict management, itself having unresolved conflicts with a few states in the
region.
Iran’s international political challenges include
allegations regarding state terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Both these
allegations are directed at the Iranian state, while terrorism in most nations
is a non-state phenomenon. The country is also viewed as a failed state that
cannot or does not protect the human rights of its people.
Domestic politics is equally problematic. Iran is
an authoritarian state that allows dissent but also represses opposition
selectively. It divides the population into Khoudis or conformists and
ghair-e Khoudis or nonconformist. Iran allows elections but screens
candidates on an ideological basis. All these are the consequence of ideological
rigidity and power monopoly.
Economically, too, Iran does not fare well in the
new world. It is partially integrated into the global economy through the
extractive oil sector. Iran’s share of the total imports of industrialized
countries (including oil) is only 0.2 percent. Non-oil share will be totally
insignificant as only15 percent of Iran’s total exports are non-oil. Its share
of the total exports from the same countries is about 0.3 percent. Seventy five
percent of Iran’s imports are consumer goods; only 1 percent is capital goods.
Iran’s foreign investment also remains miniscule -
only $400 million are invested in non-oil sector by foreign capital in Iran
since the revolution. Iran’s manufacturing value added per capita in 2001 was
only $285 (1990 US dollars) compared to $876 for the developing countries. Iran
is undeveloped and largely isolated from the international markets.
Iran is decades behind in technological
development, and this is despite the fact that its people could have created a
powerful competitive economy. Iran is particularly decades behind in the seven
or eight key industries of our age: electronic, telecommunication, computer
hardware and software, new materials, biotechnology, civil aviation, and genetic
engineering. Iran spends less than 0.1 percent of its GNP on research and
development. Compare this figure to the figure for South Korea: 4 percent of
GNP.
Iran continues to mismanage its economy,
which has declined relative to the years immediately preceding the revolution.
Managers are appointed on ideological and relational bases, not on the basis of
expertise or merit. Corruption and rent-seeking is rampant and the government
dominates and leads the economy at the expense of the private sector, except for
a well-connected minority.
Iran predominantly views its national strength and
defense in military terms, and thus pours its resources into various war
machines in the army, the Revolutionary Guard, and the paramilitary forces. This
tendency is partly imposed on Iran as it lives in a dangerous neighborhood. But
the problem is that some in the
government actually believe in the use of force and in the effectiveness of
offensive force.
Socially, too, there are disturbing developments
in the country when compared to developments globally. Some 30 percent live
below the poverty line and the female share of the total earned income is about
10 percent. Women are also repressed politically more than the men. The youth
unemployment stands at over 30 percent, and the annual rate of brain drain is 5
for every 1000 Iranians. The young Iranians – seventy percent of Iranians are
below 30 years – also suffer from the lack of social recreations. Many are
addicted to drugs. Ethnic groups remain restless and some are plotting with
foreign forces for separatist movements.
There is also some good news. The country’s
political culture is changing. Foreign policy is increasingly based on national
interest, away from Islam and certain disintegrative forces. There is a
recognition that new nuclear proliferators will not be tolerated, and
identification with terrorists is dangerous. An increasing number of the
political elite now sees offensive force as counterproductive, though Tehran
continues to have a hard time grasping the value of defensive force.
The role of government is being increasingly
challenged by some 2,500 NGOs throughout the country and active in tens of
fields, largely in humanitarian areas. The Bam quake tragedy was a turning point
for a clear break between the state and NGOs. It demonstrated the fact that the
legitimacy of the state has sharply declined due to its inefficiency and the
lack of accountability.
There are positive developments in the
economic sphere too. Iran as yet has no multinational corporations, but the
business community is increasingly asserting its relative autonomy. This is
particularly true of the small industrial entrepreneurs in forefront of the
struggle for modernization and rationalization of the economy. A few Iranian
companies now operate internationally and an expatriate counterpart has also
emerged in the West. The internationalization of these companies will help
Iran’s economic integration, technology transfer, capital flow, and foreign
partnership.
There is some good news socially as well. The
middle class continues to remain assertive and demand liberalism and democracy.
Relative to the past times, their numbers are large and their quality high. They
now have better connections with both the working people and the modern sections
of the upper classes. It is particularly important to note the progress that
Iranian women are making in private and public domains. Their literacy rate and
economic independence has improved significantly in recent years. They now have
among them great artists and poets, powerful political voices, a Noble laureate,
an Oscar nominee, a best-selling author, and a beauty queen.
Ultimately, the main source of Iran’s wealth today
and tomorrow is its people. Here too there is good news. The level of education
and professionalism is fast improving. There are now over 7 million university
graduates in the country. These achievements, notwithstanding, Iranians continue
to fail to generate visionary leaders among themselves. Why so? In a nutshell,
the problem is rooted in the undeveloped nature of the Iranian polity, largely
in the absence of political parties.
To conclude the arguments thus far, Iran’s
achievements in international relations, economic growth and new technologies,
political development, social justice, and cultural progress, do not afford it a
prestigious address in the new world. I dare to say that, unfortunately, Iran
has become a P.O. Box nation. And there is only one alternative to acquiring a
prestigious identity and place for Iran in the new world: developing a new
vision for the future of Iran and nurturing a visionary leadership.
A Vision for the Future
Setting the right vision and defining the
qualities of the required leadership for Iran is a national, collective task, in
which all Iranians must be fully involved. Let me begin with myself, and give
you a general outline of what I think needs to be done to transform Iran into a
developed and democratic country.
I believe in and strive for a democratic and
developed Iran and consider myself a national developmental democrat
(democrat-e melli touse’gar) in an ideal sense. In my view, the best form
in which a developed national democracy (democracy-ye mellitouse’yafteh)
can be implemented is a secular republican parliamentary system (jomhouri-ye
parlemani-ye orfi) where all public positions are subject to free and
periodic elections. The state and religion are distinctly separate in such a
republic as are the three branches of the state – executive, legislative, and
judicial, each directly elected by the people. Separation of powers is the key
to a democratic and well-functioning republican system.
Given Iran’s current political divisions and
social structure, a coalition government (dowlat-e e’etelaaf)
representing the interests of the Iranian entrepreneurs, the middle class, and
the working people is the only sustainable form of the envisioned republic. Such
interests include economic growth, political development and social justice
respectively. Iran’s national independence, territorial integrity and cultural
heritage are the common grounds for the Iranians who wish to build a democratic
country. Such a coalition government must reject all forms of political revenge
and all kinds of discrimination, particularly those directed against women,
youth, the poor, and minorities.
The national administrative form for such a
national democratic republic is unitary-federalism (federal-e
motamarkez), meaning a system that allows for genuine functional and
territorial self-government. In a unitary system (vertically centralized),
functions or sectors rule while territories are seen as mere location of
activities. In a federal system (horizontally decentralized), territories rule
while sectors and functions are viewed as incidental to the working of the
system. In a unitary-federal system (controlled decentralization), territories
are given decision-making power and the power to mobilize and allocate
resources, while sectors and functions are equally valued as fundamental agents
of change across territories and at the national level.
In a unitary-federal system, communities and
sectors together form the building blocs of the society for administration,
planning and development purposes. Only functions of national and international
significance are reserved for the national government, such as defense, foreign
policy, national currency, strategic economic sectors, national infrastructure,
and the like. No parallel governmental organizations are allowed, and there will
be no authority without responsibility and accountability. The Iranian ethnic groups will gain
significant self-governing rights, while the core Persian ethnic group would not
fear autonomy or separatist movements.
The contents of an Iranian republican national
parliamentarian democracy are reflected in the United Nations’ Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and in the progressive national heritage of the
Iranian society dating back to Cyrus the Great and his Proclamation for Human
Rights (the Katibeh). Iran
is a signatory to the Declaration and must abide by its values, including
individual and societal rights and liberties. Failure in securing human rights for all
Iranians according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not an
option.
Six mutually inclusive interests form the
foundation of a democratic Iran. They are: national independence, social
justice, political democracy, economic development, cultural reformation, and
international peace. These interests reflect the needs of six corresponding
groups of stakeholders: the Iranian nation, the working people, the middle
class, the entrepreneurs, the cultural communities, and the global society.
These interests must be enshrined in a democratically developed constitution and
their implementation must be entrusted on a democratically elected coalition
government.
First is national independence and territorial
integrity. This is best achieved by comprehensive national development and
expansion of friendly and cooperative relations with every nation in the global
community based on national interests and world peace. Iran must increasingly
move away from the concept of military strength to economic strength in its
defense planning, and play a significant role in the United Nations and in its
global agencies, conventions and treaties.
National sovereignty is now increasingly defined
in terms of the sovereign rights of the people, not just the governments. A
sovereign nation gains legitimacy, and thus national power, by democratic
practices, balanced and sustainable national development, and the maintenance of
law and order. National integrity requires that ethnic and religious minorities
be provided with equal rights and opportunities..
Second is social justice. To me, this concept
includes, but goes beyond, the provision of basic socio-economic needs of the
disadvantaged people, such as job, education, health care, housing and
recreation. It also includes justice in political, cultural, territorial, and
international areas. A right justice system in a society is as critical for
achieving social justice, as is a right economic system. In a just society
people have equal rights and are provided with equal opportunities, and
discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, age, religion, race, place, national
origin, economic situation and political affiliation are constitutionally
prohibited. The working people are the vanguard of social justice in a just
society.
Third is political development. This will
include principles of liberal democracy and constitutional rights. Political
development entails developing political societies such as political parties and
a developmental state. A total rejection of all forms of violence, including
political revenge, is key to developing a progressive political culture. All
citizens have equal rights in all spheres of life and the state is an elected
servant of the people. Nobody is above the law and rights based on divine
reasons, ideology or heritage must be constitutionally barred. All forms of
individual and social freedom must be guaranteed. The middle class is the agent
of political development.
Fourth is economic development. This means
developing people’s intellectual and material capacities, and they can be best
achieved by a liberal economic system that accounts for social needs and
environmental preservation. I call this a social market economy. For such an
economy to properly function, it will require the leadership of a democratic and
independent entrepreneurial class and the guiding supervision of a developmental
state. The building blocks of a balanced and sustainable economy are individuals
and local communities. For such an economic system to prosper,
industrialization, science, and technology must be highly supported, as should
participation in global trade and financial institutions. Only then can Iran
become a modern global power in the 21st century.
Fifth is cultural development. This involves
finding the right mix of tradition and modernity and will include allowing for
religious freedom and spiritual development of individuals and communities as
well as the recognition of diversity among peoples and localities. Iran lives in
a region of predominantly Moslem nations and is an Islamic country. However,
Iranians need an Islamic reformation on which the nation’s transition to a
modern society will largely depend.
Sixth is international peace. Peace within a
nation and peace among nations are two sides of the same phenomenon. The new
Iranian nationalism must increasingly become globalist and integrationist, not
parochial and isolationist as in the past. Peace, internal and international, is
the foundation on which democracy and development is built. There is no
alternative to a foreign policy that makes peace with all nations its top
priority. Iran must avoid all rejectionist forces and disavow all violent means
including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
The six needs and stakeholders identified above do
not exhaust the list. About seventy percent of the Iranian population is under
thirty years old, and fifty percent are women. Both these groups are oppressed,
though in dissimilar ways. A democratic Iran will provide the basic rights and
needs of both groups across all spheres of their lives, jobs and civil rights in
particular. Ethnic and religious minorities are also disadvantaged and their
rights and needs must also be provided. The other two deprived groups are the
poor and disabled Iranians. A
civilized nation will concern itself with these social groups and attend to
their basic needs.
In sum, Iran is a country rich in resources but
poor in achievements. This gap indicates, above all, the failure of its
leadership to envision Iran’s national and group interests, invite participation
of the Iranian people in decision-making, help form a culture of transparency
and democratic practices, promote the role of law, and advance state discipline
and accountability. The failure of
the leadership in turn is rooted in a transitional political culture that still
relies on the old ways of thinking and doing as well as organizing and
institutionalizing. The Iranian nation needs to create a wholly new Iran if it
were to acquire a prestigious address in the new world.