Delegates from France, Germany and Britain presented a statement to the Board of Governors critical of Iranian nuclear program.
Responding to the concerns of the European states, Iranian representative said that storage in Isfahan is not part of the uranium conversion process. Data and Information Quality (DIQ) on the storage facilities was submitted to the agency prior to the complementary access which took place on December 15, 2004.
"To imply that this was a revelation is not consistent with the facts. In any event it is obvious that the matter is, at most, an inadvertent error in proper communication between Iran and the agency."
On centrifuge components in Farayand, he said that they consist solely of non-essential items, were for preventive maintenance and have nothing to do with voluntary suspension.
The technical necessity of such activities for the preservation and maintenance of these components along with other essential items, currently under the Agency's seals, has been discussed with the technical staff since November 2004; This is prior to the commencement of the voluntary suspension.
"We welcome the cooperation offered by other states and the steps taken by the Agency toward the conclusion of issues related to contamination and P-2. We have provided the Agency with information on shipping, procurement and any other information, all above and beyond our safeguards obligations, which could be helpful for this purpose. We will continue to closely cooperate with the Agency, as this process proceeds, to assist the Agency to finalize this matter," he said.
The visit to Parchin was responded to positively, not as an obligatory commitment of course, but as a matter of enhancing confidence. As the DDG stated in his presentation, the modality was agreed in advance, leaving the option to the Agency to select the zone with highest priority among the designated zones at its own discretion. This agreement was implemented in full. An additional request falls beyond the initially agreed modality.
"On this and other matters related to dual use items two serious concerns continue to prevail.
"There seems to be a tendency for these visits to proliferate unduly forming an open-ended process relies on unreliable open-sources information should be revisited.
"Confidentiality of information has, despite our repeated requests and all efforts of the director general, almost never been maintained."
Concerns on this issue are more intense in view of potential threats of military strikes against safeguarded and other facilities visited by Agency in Iran.
On that latter point, the sheer notion of threats by Nuclear Weapons States against a Non-Nuclear Weapons State, is an issue of major significance as it undermines the very essence of the NPT and bears alarming consequences to the security and the stability of the region. It has to be confronted head on.
"Iran's intention is being a nuclear fuel producer and supplier and a player in the future of this lucrative market is firm and unalterable. At the same time there is no intention of diversion, now or ever, and this can be assured credibly by the Agency.
An agreement with E3/EU is envisaged and pursued on the basis of exchange of firm and objective guarantees. Such an agreement is both possible and accessible at technical level. It does seem however to require an improved political environment conducive to a mutually acceptable agreement."
... Payvand News - 3/2/05 ... --