Investigations Lag, Two Years After
Abu Ghraib Photos
(Washington, D.C., April 26, 2006) –
Two years after the Abu Ghraib scandal, new research shows that abuse of
detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq, Afghanistan, and at Guantánamo Bay has been
widespread, and that the United States has taken only limited steps to
investigate and punish implicated personnel.
A briefing paper issued today, “By
the Numbers,” presents findings of the Detainee Abuse and Accountability
Project, a joint project of New York University’s Center for Human Rights and
Global Justice, Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First. The project is the
first comprehensive accounting of credible allegations of torture and abuse in
U.S. custody in
Iraq, Afghanistan and
Guantánamo.
“Two years ago, U.S. officials said the abuses at Abu Ghraib were
aberrations and that people who abused detainees would be brought to justice,”
said Professor Meg Satterthwaite, faculty director of the Center for Human
Rights and Global Justice at NYU Law
School. “Yet our research
shows that detainee abuses were widespread, and few people have truly been
brought to justice.”
The project has collected hundreds
of allegations of detainee abuse and torture occurring since late 2001 –
allegations implicating more than 600 U.S. military and civilian personnel
and involving more than 460 detainees.
The project found that many abuses
were never investigated, and investigations that did occur often closed
prematurely, or stalled without resolution. In cases where abuses were
substantiated and perpetrators identified by military investigators, military
commanders often chose to use weak non-judicial disciplinary measures as
punishment, instead of pursuing criminal courts-martial. Of the courts-martial
that did take place, the majority resulted in either prison sentences of less
than a year, or punishments that did not involve jail time (such as discharge or
rank-reduction).
“We’ve seen a series of half-hearted
investigations and slaps on the wrist,” said Tom
Malinowski, Washington advocacy director for Human Rights
Watch. “The government seems more interested in managing the detainee abuse
scandal than in addressing the underlying problems that caused
it.”
The project found that the vast
majority of those who were investigated for abuse were enlisted military
personnel, not officers. Under military law, officers can be held accountable
for the abuses of their subordinates under the doctrine of command
responsibility. The project did not find a single case in which an officer was
held accountable under that doctrine.
“There’s been a failure of
accountability for detainee abuse at the command level,” said Elisa Massimino, Washington director for Human Rights First.
“Without accountability up the chain of command, there won’t be deterrence, and
the torture and abuses we’ve documented likely will
continue.”
The Detainee Abuse and
Accountability Project (DAA) was initiated in March 2005 as a joint research
effort to collect and analyze credible allegations of abuse of detainees in U.S.
custody in Afghanistan, Iraq, and at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility, and
to assess what actions, if any, the U.S. government has taken in response to
these allegations. The project has also recorded investigations, disciplinary
measures, or criminal prosecutions that are linked to abuse
allegations.
Among the key findings released
today:
·
Detainee abuse has been widespread.
The DAA Project has documented more than 330 cases in which U.S. military
and civilian personnel are credibly alleged to have abused, tortured or killed
detainees. These cases implicate more than 600 U.S. personnel
and involve more than 460 detainees.
·
Only a fraction of the more than 600
U.S. personnel implicated in these
cases – 40 people – have been sentenced to prison
time.
·
Of the hundreds of allegations of
abuse collected by the DAA Project, only about half appear to have been
adequately investigated.
·
In cases where courts-martial – the
military’s equivalent of criminal trials – have convened, the majority of prison
sentences have been for less than a year, even in cases involving serious abuse.
Only 10 U.S. personnel have been sentenced to
a year or more in prison.
·
No U.S. military
officer has been held accountable for criminal acts committed by subordinates
under the doctrine of command responsibility. Only three officers have been
convicted by court-martial for detainee abuse.
·
Although approximately 20 civilians,
including CIA agents, have been referred to the Department of Justice for
criminal prosecution for detainee abuse, the Department of Justice has shown
minimal initiative in moving forward in abuse cases. The Department of Justice
has not indicted a single CIA agent for abusing detainees; it has indicted only
one civilian contractor.
Recommendations
In order to remedy the serious
failures of accountability that the DAA Project research documents, the Center
for Human Rights and Global Justice, Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First
recommend that:
·
Congress should appoint an
independent commission to review U.S. detention and interrogation
policy and operations worldwide.
·
The secretary of defense and the
attorney general should order their departments: (1) to move forward promptly
with investigations of allegations of torture and other abuse of detainees in
U.S. custody abroad; (2) to initiate prosecutions where the evidence warrants;
and (3) to instruct relevant authorities to ensure that appropriate criminal
action is taken against all persons implicated in killings, torture, and other
abuse, whatever their rank or position.
·
The secretary of defense should
appoint a single, high-level, centralized authority who can convene and
prosecute courts-martial across the branches of the military to investigate all
U.S. military personnel – no
matter their rank – who participated in, ordered, or bear command responsibility
for war crimes or torture, or other prohibited mistreatment of detainees in
U.S.
custody.
·
Congress should implement a check on
officer promotions, by requiring that each branch of the military certify, for
any officer whose promotion requires Senate confirmation, that the officer is
not implicated in any case of detainee torture, abuse, or other mistreatment,
including through the doctrine of command
responsibility.
The briefing paper “By
the Numbers: Findings of the Detainee Abuse and Accountability
Project” is available at:
http://hrw.org/reports/2006/ct0406/