By Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh Ph.D.
(London; 31st May 2006)
Chairman
of Urosevic Research Foundation - London and
Professor of Political geography and geopolitics - Tarbiat Modarres University - Tehran
A Look
at Some of the more recently propagated UAE arguments
Territorial claims for
nation-building exercise
In my previous works I introduced
masses of documents and evidence about Iran's legal and legitimate ownership of the 3
islands and about their legal return to Iran in 1971. Today I would like to
talk about the ways in which the UAE tries to make something out of nothing by
confusing public opinion.
The United Arab Emirates has been
experiencing difficulties in creating real and true national cohesion in that
federation of the seven political entities of Arab tribal identity (Arab
Emirates). Lack of any real challenge of political geography nature to this
identity seems to have deprived the notion of nation-building process of the
necessary stimulant that would bear the fruit of national cohesion. Abu Dhabi's vociferous
claims on the Islands of Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa, seems to have
worked inadvertently to strengthen the Iranian national unity instead of its
intended results for the UAE. This was to act as a hot subject of the UAE's
territorial dispute with the only non-Arab state (Iran) of the region, but it
seems to have failed to play the magical role of a cause celebre at the
Middle Eastern regional level as a symbol of Arab nationalist resistance to the
spread of Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf (1). Domestically, it was
expected to become the symbol of a foreign territorial challenge that would
stimulate growth of the sense of a 'nationhood' that would be particular to the
UAE.
Failing to achieve any real results
from the above strategy seems to have lead Abu Dhabi to adopt a more fundamental
undertaking of a massive cultural project aimed at creating a new historical
identity for the region by trying to re-write regional history. The ultimate aim
in this cultural venture seems to be complete denial of all aspects of the
history of the region that would one way or another relate to Iran and her
traditional sovereignty of the southern coasts of the Persian Gulf. Supported by
more radical nationalists (pan-Arabist) quarters in places like
Qatar, Kuwait, and to some extent Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi has benefited from many obliging
regional and British academics. In addition to declaring in the title of his
book the three islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa in the persian Gulf as being owned
by the United Arab Emirates, Thomas R. Mattair (2), for instance has argued that
these islands belonged to the emirates of Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah for many
centuries, without being able to address the fundamental issue of these
emirates' existence prior to the 20th century as independent
territorial states with spatial dimension that could enable them to claim any
territory as representing their legal dominion. In fact when the idea of
determining territorial dimension for the tribal entities of Eastern Arabia and
defining boundary lines among them was expressed by the authorities of
Indo-European telegraph line in 1864, British Political Resident in the Persian
Gulf, Colonel Lewis Pelly, opposed it on the basis that implementation of these
European concepts in Eastern Arabia was 'inexpedient' at the time (3).
The concept of territorial
sovereignty in the Western sense did not exist in Eastern
Arabia, A ruler exercised jurisdiction over a territory by virtue of
his jurisdiction over the tribes inhabiting it. They in turn, owed loyalty to
him... (4).
These words were echoes of what many
Western scholars and diplomats like Professor John Wilkinson of Oxford University and Sir Rupert Hay, a former British
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, had
stated earlier. John Wilkinson described the British attempts of 1960s for
introducing the concept of territoriality to the local tribes and boundary
making amongst them in Eastern Arabia
as:
This ludicrous partitioning of
territory is of recent origin and stems in large measure from the imposing of
European notion of territorialism on a society to which they were
foreign......Britain sought to develop an exclusive influence in the Gulf and, later
still, to favour the claims of particular companies to act as concessionaries
for oil exploration, she was forced first into defending the protégé coastal
rulers from attack from the hinterland and then of proclaiming their authority
over the population and resources of greater Oman.... (5).
Sir Rupert Hay
states:
Before the advent of oil the desert
was in many ways similar to the high seas. Nomads and their camels roamed across
it at will... (6).
In its endeavor to establish a new
historical identity for the UAE in addition to their pan-Arabist tendencies, the
UAE Government seems to have opted for the adoption of the same strategy of
political ideology devised in 1950s and 1960s, and implemented by the former
Baath Party of Iraq in 1970s to 1990s.
Since its emergence in 1968 the
second Baath regime in Iraq launched a massive and
long-lasting anti-Iranian propaganda campaign, which became the central theme of
its promotion of Baath philosophy. This was an expected geopolitical strategy
contrasting the demographical features of Iraq. Almost 80%
of the population of what has become the state of Iraq in early 20th century is made up
of peoples of Kurdish and Shiite origin with strong cultural and ethnic ties
with Iran. Moreover, like the emirates of
southern shores of the Persian Gulf, Mesopotamia was part of what was the
Iranian federative system (Persian Empire) for
the greater part of the past three thousand years. These historical and
geographical factors did not offer a comfortable prospect to the former Baath
ideologues to work out a completely Arabic identity for Iraq that would
enable it to play the role of a leading Pan-Arab power in the region. Hence, the
Baath Party had to shed all layers of Iraq's cultural image that in any way represented
Iran or its Persian civilization. A
massive anti-Iranian campaign that had begun by the first Baath party of
Iraq in 1959 was boosted by the
re-emergence of that party in 1968.
A major feature of this endeavor was
attempts to change the name of the Persian Gulf to Arabian Gulf, changing the
ancient name of Iran's Khuzestan province into "Arabistan" and trying to sever
that province from Iran by creating a terrorist group of a few elements related
to the Iranian Arab tribes living in Khuzestan who occupied Iranian Embassy in
London in 1980 in a terrorist action and even now is heavily involved in
terrorist activities in Khuzestan and Tehran (7). Other features of this
anti-Iranian racially inclined ideology include changing the name of the islands
of Kish and
Lavan off the Iranian coasts near the straits of Hormuz, hundreds of miles away
from any where near Iraqi.
The Baath party and its political
philosophy, which symbolized their peculiar way of shaping a national identity,
had aimed at proving the argument that not only is Iraq an Arab state, but a
leading one. But this whole argument was to materialize on the strength of the
geographical fact that Baath party and Iraq's ruling class were from the Sunni
Arab population of that country which has always been in minority there, and it
was because of this weak geographical foundation of the argument that drove the
Baath regime to dictatorship of most severe kind vis-à-vis the people of Iraq
and a belligerent approach in their relations with Iran.
The Baath policy of nation-Building
was not to follow the path of a normal process of settling the crisis of
identity. All philosophers and thinkers of political, geographical and social
sciences, including famous Arab thinker Edward Said, in his famous book
Orientalism (8) concede that one normally constructs one's identity by
comparing the notion of 'us' with the notion of 'them'. But in the case of the
Baath party of Iraq, this mechanism worked
differently. In their theory Baath party was to construct an extreme form of
Pan-Arab identity for Iraq by
destroying the identity of 'them', which in this case was represented by
Persia
(Iran). This was because what
constitutes Iraq now had been
a part of the Iranian federal system known in the West as Persian Empire for centuries both before and after
Islam. To the Baath party thinkers, Cyrus the Great's conquer of Babylonia in
the mid six century BC was not to be forgiven because, no matter how
emphatically the holy books in Islam, Christianity and Judaism condemned
Babylonian tyranny and its inhumanity, to them Babylonia was an Arab state that
represented Iraq's glorious past upon which Iraq's new Pan-Arab identity had to
be constructed.
It was on the basis of this peculiar
way of reading history that a mind-boggling anti-Iranian (anti-Persian) campaign
began which lasted for 35 years, causing the eight-year war of attrition with
more than one million people dead, and hundreds of billions of dollars worth of
destruction to both countries.
The cultural aspects of this
incessant campaign involved a furiously anti-Iranian propaganda throughout the
Arab world. Even in their school books Persia (Iran) was
presented as a pure evil. In a research work entitled Sourat al-Iranian fi
al-kotob al-madresiyat al-Arabiyat (the image of Iranians in Arab school
books), Talal Adrisi, an Arab scholar points out that the image of Iran (al-
Faresi - the Persians) presented in the Iraqi school books is quite clear. He
then quotes an Iraqi history book of the time of the former regime as saying
(9):
Verily the Iranians are always the
same low-down racist Persians who have, since the time of Rashedin Caliphate
until the glorious Qadesiyah (the last of the wars of Islamic Caliphate
against Iran) of noble Saddam Hussein been against the Arab nation and its
unity, against its Arabic-Islamic civilization and against its language.... All
problems of the Arabs and the Muslims, and all conflicts and agitations, and
ethnic wars, and all efforts for the destruction of its (Arab's)
civilization are the result of Persian conspiracies.
After the fall of
Iraq's Baathist regime in 2003, there
are many indications that its brand of ideology for nation-building by
re-writing the history and revising the geography of the region is being
questioned in the Arab world. Yet, this process appears to have started in a
reverse direction in some Arab parts of the lower Persian
Gulf. In addition to rejecting many calls by Arab scholars and Arab
newspapers asking Arabs to abandon the campaign of changing the name of the
Persian Gulf (10) for instance, the UAE
Government has increased its ant-Iranian campaign. They have started to return
sea-going vessels from their shores if happened to produce their cargo-bill
bearing the name 'Persian Gulf'; they hugely increased financial support for any
journalist, academic, or politician in the West that would adopt the term
Arabian Gulf instead of the historical name of the Persian Gulf, the 2005
case of geographical controversy by National Geographic was an example; they
began to support any activity that aimed at hurting Iran, the case of financial
support for the creation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its
anti-Iranian activities in late 1990s and early years of the 2000s is one
example and its critical stance, encouraged by US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, against Iran's nuclear energy program and attempts to formulate a pan-Arab
opposition to it on the argument that close proximity of Iran's nuclear sites
would pose a danger to the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf in the events of
accidents, is another example. The UAE in putting forward this argument ignores
the fact that they have never criticized Israel's nuclear arms program and the danger of
Israeli nuclear sites proximity to the "brother" Arab nations of
Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt.
Writing and broadcasting
undocumented allegations against Iran as Persian
Empire and its founder, Cyrus the Great increased once again
both locally and in the West. Appearance of an amazing piece of slur against
Iran and its history of civilization, particularly against Iranian federative
state (the so-called Persian Empire) of the pre-Islamic era, calling it 'The
evil empire' in one of the most unlikely forums, "the Guardian" daily of
London perhaps is a good example of the revival of Baath-style campaign of
nation-building in an Arab state through expression of hatred for Iran, which
had for over 35 years brought the Arabs and Iranians nothing but wars and
devastation.
It might, however, be understandable
that these newly formed states would concern themselves with the task of
nation-building within the framework of their desired Arab identity, but
construction of one's identity cannot always be achieved through destruction of
the identity of the others. In their identity seeking efforts when some of these
emirates face the reality that the lands on which they are building their new
nations formed the southern flanks of the Iranian federative system (the
so-called Persian Empire) for thousands of year and, therefore, like the former
Baathist regime in Iraq, they too see their options limited to destroying the
Persian (Iranian) identity. While, denying in many of their texts in history and
geography the existence of such a political entity as Iran or Persia, in many other of their texts
they try to reshape the history in a manner that would justify their
anti-Iranian arguments. In a friendly exchange with an academic colleague in the
United Kingdom, who, in reply to my invitation to an academic debate, wrote on
Thursday 5 January 2006; ...my relations and interests are entirely tied up
with the Arab side of the Gulf, he stated:
Archaeological
evidence (notably by Walid al-Takriti in Buraimi area) is showing that the
Dawudi qanat go back well before the Achaemanid period and that on the contrary,
there is no firm evidence of an Achaemanid occupation of Oman. Indeed the
argument is that Oman was the original site of the
qanat development and was taken by the Persians and spread by them..... Some of
the major qanat of Oman on the western side of the
mountains predate the Achaemanid period (11).
Neither the author of
the above nor the source he refers to seem to have paused and asked the
question; considering that defining the existence of a real and actual
civilization is the pre-requisite condition for any academic claim of the
discovery of constructed infrastructure in any given area of the world, how
could qanat (underground water channel system) have been constructed in
Eastern Arabia and Oman before the Achaeminid period? They do not seem to be
concerned that before making that claim, they have to establish existence of a
civilization in that part before the advent of the Achaeminid Iranian
civilization. This is an old practice, and attempts to attribute some of better
known and well-established features and samples of ancient Iranian civilization
to modern countries like Turkey, Iraq and other Arab states of the
region, is not new. There are always those in countries of more recent emergence
who endeavor to work out an old historical identity for the new nations through
re-writing the history. There are claims that qanat was first constructed by
ancient Turks who did not even live in southwest Asia before 12th century AD. Some others who
are more concerned about purifying their Western identity of any eastern
cultural feature, have attributed to Rome almost all of the well known ancient
Iranian invention such as the qanat underground water channel system, coinage
(gold Daric and silver Ziglus), road system (the Royal Road)
etc.
A closer look at the
terminologies used in the above quoted letter is more revealing. In another part
the author refers to the lack of "firm evidence of an Achaemanid occupation of
Oman". This sentence represent lack
of care in the use of the term "occupation" in reference to the presence of
Achaeminid Iran in southern coasts of the persian Gulf and what is now Oman and
Emirates. The term occupation is normally used in reference to the legal or
illegal act of taking a piece of land from the hands of a previous owner. But in
the case of Oman and southern
coasts of the Persian Gulf the authors do not
bother to identify an owner-occupier of those areas prior to the advent of the
Achaeminid state. The existence of the qanats in those areas is the evidence of
Achaemanid presence there. On the other hand, they seem to have difficulty in
contemplating that no much evidence of the Achaeminid presence are to be found
in many areas of the interior of Iran, but that does not suggest that a
civilization and a political system (federative state) that had ruled and
administered over the largest part of the civilized world of 6th to
3rd centuries BC, did not exist in its core areas (lands between and
around the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf).
All local historical
evidence, all Arab texts of history like Tabari, Masudi, Yaqubi, Maqdasi, Ibn
Huqal etc. confirm what Sir Arnold T. Wilson has asserted in his highly
acclaimed publication in 1928 on the Persian Gulf that:
There are myths dating
the origin of the people of the Persian Gulf to the meeting of three branches of
mankind on the shores of the Gulf in about 10,000 BC: the Drividian of the
Makran coasts (Iran) absorbed by their Baluchi conquerors (Iran); the Semites of
the Arabian highlands who displaced or absorbed the original Hamitic
Euro-African aborigines; and the proto-Elamites of southwestern Iran (12).
The political
geography of Eastern Arabia (southern coasts of the Persian
Gulf) followed the same pattern of political development in that
entire region since the dawn of history. This region first experienced the
existence of 'state' in the modern sense of the word, in the mid-sixth century
BC when the Achaeminid (559 to 330 BC) consolidated their federative system,
which included most of the civilized world of the time. Iranian settlement and
political domination of these areas were consolidated under the Sassanids
(224-651 AD) (13). All Arab and Islamic sources of history of human movements in
that Part of the lower Persian Gulf indicate that the first of any migratory
movements of Arab tribes to those parts began in a few decades before the advent
of Islam according to the all Arab sources of ancient history and to firm local
evidence used by Dr. John Wilkinson of Oxford University who discloses
that:
The main Shanu'a
groupings of Arab immigrants from the interior of Arabia were established in the
mountain of Musandam and Oman proper in the early sixth
century AD, when the Kawadh (Qobads) ruled the region. It was probably in
association with this migration into Oman that elements of the Kinda also
came to settle in the mountain areas of jabal Kinda near Buraimi Oasis. Other
Arab migration who settled in the desert and border areas of Oman formed the
Azd Federation. Faced with this massive new tribal union of migant Arabs, the
Iranian rulers of the region had no alternative but to accord the newcomers a
degree of autonomy under their own tribal leadership (14).
Re-Writing history to formulate
national identity
In addition to the necessity of
being familiar with the evolution of legally inclined concept of territoriality
and territorial ownership in South East Arabia and southern shores of the
Persian Gulf, and before speaking of "centuries of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah's
history of ownership of territories in and around the Persian Gulf, Thomas R.
Mattairs of our time aught to establish first; what is the history of statehood
in that part of the world; second, how long these emirates have been in
existence as political entities of legal and territorial dimension, and third;
what was the role of the British in 19th and 20th century
in allocating lands to various emirates at will. In this context, in order to
avoid repetition of issues and instances of historical and legal arguments, I
would refer these authors to carefully study chapters XVII, XVIII, IXX and XX in
this book for matters related to history of statehood in The Persian Gulf,
history of the existence of the Arab Emirates of the Persian Gulf, and the role
the British played in allocating territories to various state or tribal entities
at will in 19th and 20th century. The agents of British
colonial rule in the region in 19th and early 20th
century, who were the instruments of colonial interference in the political
geography of the Persian Gulf and allocated various territories to different
entities in the region, conveniently denied all aspects of Iran's traditional
dominion and her sovereignty connections with the southern coasts of the Persian
Gulf, but several British scholars and academics like Sir Arnold T. Wilson, Dr.
John C. Wilkinson, Sir Rupert hay, Donald Hawley, J. B. Kelly etc have made
reasonable references to these traditional realities of the region in their
scholarly works.
Here, it suffice to briefly state
that even the name Ras al-Kheimah is reminder of Iran's age old sovereignty
presence in southern coasts of the Persian Gulf. Iran's
pre-Islamic dominion and sovereignty over these areas were well defined and well
documented. The term Ras al-Kheimah is an Arabic construction of two parts:
Ras is head (the tip of) in Arabic, and Kheimah means tent in both
Arabic and Persian. Ras al-Kheimah therefore, means the 'tip of tends',
and that is in reference to the tip of the tented headquarter of
Iran's military camp in that vicinity
during the time of nadir Shah Afshar (first half of the 18th
century). Iran's post-Islamic sovereignty and
presence were defined in terms of Islamic territorial description, and continued
albeit vaguely until the arrival in the Persian Gulf of British colonialism and
start of their interference in the political geography of the region as from
1820 when they signed their first treaty of peace with the tribal entities
therein. They continued this task and by 1899 signed many similar treaties that
brought all major tribal entities under British protection and sovereignty. The
Iranian Government protested against this process of colonization of Iranian
dependent entities in the south of the Persian Gulf and Prime Minister in
mid-1840s, Haji Mirza Aghasi issued a warning reminding the British that all
ports and islands in and around the Persian Gulf belonged to Iran, but they
preferred to ignore his warnings (15). Here, it might be worthwhile to bring to
the attention of the authors at the service of the UAE government claim to the
three islands in question one of many historical documents verifying
acknowledgement by rulers of tribal entities of southern coasts of the
Persian Gulf of historical tradition of Iranian
sovereignty over those areas. The following is the text of articles I, II, and
III of a formal letter from Sheikh Sultan Bin Saqar of Ras al-Kheimah to the
Iranian authorities most relevant to the status of Ras al-Kheimah as a
dependency of Iran like other tribal entities of southern coasts of the Persian
Gulf which had enjoyed the same status vaguely throughout the post-Islamic
history of the region. In this letter, which is dated 17 of Sha'ban 1272 H.Q.
(23 April 1865), the ruler of Ras al-Kheimah principally requests from the
authorities in Tehran to grant him the lease of Bandar Abbas on the northern
coasts of the Persian Gulf; for that he argues that as Ras al-Kheimah was an
Iranian dominion, its leasing of Bandar Abbas would benefit Iran without even
encountering any legal problem:
Articles 1, 2 and 4 of the statement
of His Highness the Sheikh of all Sheikhs, His Excellency Sheikh Sultan Bin
Saqar (16)
Article 1; The first issue is that I am
grateful to you, and like my ancestors from the oldest time, we have been
your servant, companion, and
subject, and today also I am your servant, companion and subject, and I am ready
for your command and instructions so that whatever command you might have to be
carry out with our lives, by myself, my children, my clan and my tribe, we are
all your subjects and citizens and servants and abide by your instructions. And
Ras al-Kheimah has been your (territorial) dominion since the oldest time and is
now an Iranian territory.
Article 2; The second issue is that if I were
to have a person in Bandar Abbas, I will see to all affairs of Bandar Abbas
perfectly and completely as might be asked of me. But if the forced of Sayyed
Saeed (Sultan of Oman) come and position themselves before Bandar Abbas, I could
not see it and keep silent, it would be inevitable that I challenged him and
chase him out of that place. If I were to challenge him at sea the
England will be the obstacle, and
would say I am the lord of the sea. On whose permission and on whose authority
are you quarrelling in the sea? You get a letter from the English or issue an
order to the English not to challenge me at all in the sea so that not only I
could see to the service of your maritime affairs to the best of my ability, but
also I could add all coasts and islands in Oman to your
dominion.
Article 4; the fourth issue is that as I
stayed in Bandar Abbas, the province of Ras al-Kheimah is a vast province. Some of
the time there are disturbances and your support is essential. As I have become
in your charge, your subject, and have accepted citizenship of the Iranian
Government and my children, my tribe and clan request to send 4 divisions of
soldiers with a commander and ten canons and a sufficient amount of
Qur-Khaneh (a 19th century Persian word for armory, arsenal,
shot guns, or ammunition) and all expenses to Ras al-Kheimah where they could be
stationed permanently.... (17).
Even as late as 1969 Arab scholars
verified that the issue of territorial sovereignty in the southern coasts of the
Persian Gulf was of an Arab-Iranian mixture. In
an interview with the Iranian press, Dr. Sayyed Mohammad Nufel of
Egypt, visiting Tehran in his capacity as
Deputy Secretary General of the Arab League, stated:
I redecul the efforts for changing
the name of the Persian Gulf and condemn these
futile efforts... I have made some studies about the region of the Persian Gulf
and published a book in 1952 in which I used the term Persian Gulf, only saying
that the Sheikhdoms were neither Arab nor Iranian, but a mixture of both.... (18).
The Iranian Government had as from
the year 1950 imposed visa requirement for the inhabitants of the lower Persian
Gulf traveling into Iran. Before that date, they carried
an Iranian identity document that allowed them to travel freely between the
opposite coasts.
The Anglo-Iranian territorial
contention, which began in 1840s with Haji Mirza Aghasi's declaration of
opposition to the British annexation of ports and islands of lower Persian Gulf,
the most prominent of which in the twentieth century were the issues of Iran's
claim on Bahrain and Britain's claim on Tunbs and Abu Musa on behalf of its
client emirates, continued throughout the 19th and early
20th centuries until in 1965 when negotiations began between the two
for a north-south maritime divide in the Persian Gulf. Though these negotiations
did not produce conclusive agreements on the subject, it established in 1966 the
median line of the sea as a principle upon which the continental shelf between
Iran and her Arab neighbours was to
be divided. It was on the basis of this principle that the subsequent maritime
delimitation agreements were achieved. This was a decision on an ad hoc
basis that the median line of the Persian Gulf would become the term of
reference on which the maritime areas of the sea would be delimited and
delineated between Iran to
the north, and Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to the south (19). This
was a general understanding on the basis of which the Iranians accepted that the
southern limits of their sovereignty rights retreated to the median line of the
Persian Gulf and therefore, relinquished claims on Bahrain
archipelago in 1970. The British also decided, after intensive negotiations
throughout the 1970 and 1971 to return the three islands of Tunb and Abu Musa,
situated in the northern half of the Persian Gulf and on the median line
respectively to Iran.
Doubting validity of official
British Government documents
Another issue of significance to be
noted by all observers is the fact that in addition to hundreds of British
government documents verifying Iran's ownership of the Islands of Tunb and Abu
Musa, there are numerous official British maps also confirming Iran's
sovereignty rights to these islands (20). In a round table discussion between
Iranian and Arab academics in London in November 1992 this author produced 24
maps, mostly compiled officially by the British government in the
18th and 19th centuries that proved Iranian possession of
the islands in question. Prior to the said meeting it was widely believed in
Iran, the Arab World and In the West
that only a single official British map, produced in 1886, clearly recognized
Iranian sovereignty over the islands. Even that single map became the subject of
controversy in that meeting as Mr. Richard Schofield, a British academic at
London Kings College of no apparent connection to the UAE conspiratorial
attempts to re-write the history of the region, responded positively to a
question put to him by the Ambassador of the Arab League in London, that the
1886 official British map was compiled by mistake. Reacting to this allegation,
this author (Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh) explained that the map in question is a huge
drawing in several sheets, the sheet containing the vicinity of the three
islands in the Persian Gulf is as big as 2 by 1 square meters, each of the three
islands of Tunb and Abu Musa appearing on it in a size larger than a dinner
plate with the term 'IRAN' printed inside each of them from side to side. He
then questioned how a map as big as this and as simple as this could be compiled
by mistake by the War Office of Great Britain, a very knowledgeable colonial
office whose success in helping to establishing world's greatest empire was the
result of its thoroughness. Nevertheless, Mr. Schofield repeated this allegation
in another meeting of academics discussing the 'international boundaries of
Iran' (London School of Oriental and
African Studies, 9-10 October 2002) (21) without being able to present any
evidence that could in any way substantiate the
allegation.
The Map of the Persian Gulf
as the 1886 map is called, was compiled by the Intelligence Division of the War
Office of the United
Kingdom. A copy of this map was presented to
Nasr ad-Din Shah Qajar of Iran in 1888 on the instruction of
Lord Salisbury, British Foreign Secretary at the time. Seeing the map, the Shah
rightly concluded that the map barred any other argument on Anglo-Sharjah
sovereignty over these islands. When Sir Drummond Wolf, British Minister
plenipotentiary in Tehran, expressed regrets that
the map had been presented to the Iranian monarch precisely because it confirmed
Iran's territorial
possessions in the Persian Gulf, including the
islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa, Lord Salisbury remarked: take note that maps
shall never be presented in future (22). Yet, as it was already too late,
the map was published again in 1891 in colour, showing the three islands in the
colour of Iran. Mr. Schofield alleges that
embarrassment over showing 'by mistake' the three islands as Iranian owned, was
the reason for Lord Salisbury's remarks on the margin of British Ambassador's
report, instructing the banning of presentation of official maps to foreign
heads of states. This is clearly to overlook the simple and straight forward
situation, and that was that the British government's embarrassment was over the
discovery by the Shah of Iran of their double dealing on the issue of
sovereignty on these islands. On the one hand they had been corresponding with
the Shah's government claiming Sharjah's ownership of these islands while, on
the other hand, they officially and in their official documents acknowledge the
truth about authenticity of Iranian sovereignty over the same islands.
Other British academic or diplomats
of note who have discussed the issue of the three islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa
and have made references to this map, have not even hinted to any possibility of
it being compiled by mistake. Sir Denis Wright, a veteran British diplomat who
studied the issue of Anglo-Iranian relations in details in two volumes has made
references to the 1886 War Office map and its presentation to Naser ad-Din Shah
without even making any suggestion or hinting any question about the validity of
the map being doubted. Rather he implies that presentation of this map to the
Shah strengthened Iran's case. He
states:
A War Office map, presented by the
British Minister [in Tehran} to the Shah in 1888, showed all the islands [the
two Tunbs, Abu Musa and Sirri] in Persian colour: the Persian case was further
strengthened with the publication in 1992 of Curzon's two-volume Persia and
Persian Question in which the map, prepared by the Royal geographical
Society under Curzon's own supervision, also showed the islands as Persian
territory (23).
When in the symposium on Iranian
boundaries (9-10 October 2002) Mr. Schofield was reminded of the fact that the
1886 Map of the Persian Gulf was reprinted in 1891 by the British
Government which is an official verification of the authenticity of the map, he
argued that as it was too late to do anything about it being compiled by
mistake, the British authority decided to compile all subsequent publication
with the mistake. Certainly this cannot be but an unnecessary admission of wrong
doing on the part of the British Government. Moreover, this could also cause
doubt also about validity of other official maps of British Government,
published subsequent to the publication in 1886 and 1891 of the Map of the
Persian Gulf, including the Official Map of Persia (in six sheets):
compiled in 1897 in the Simla Drawing office, Survey of India, Administration of
topography of the Indian Foreign Office, in which the islands of Tunb and Abu
Musa are shown in the colour of the Iranian mainland.
Moreover, in an unlikely situation
should Mr. Schofield's far fetched insinuation be accepted that all official
maps of Iran or Persia and/or the Persian Gulf, published
by the British Government subsequent to the 1886 map, were compiled deliberately
with mistake on the issue of verification in those maps of Iranian ownership of
the three islands, then he will not be in any position to question authenticity
and correctness of the official British Government maps compiled and published
before publication of the 1886 map, which could not have been affected in any
way by possible problems that might have occurred in the completion of the 1886
map. Here, at least six examples of such maps, compiled and published before
1886 can be introduced, and they are as follow:
1- Map of The Persian Empire;
compiled in 1813 by John Macdonald Kinner, Political Adviser to Sir John
Malcolm, British Envoy, in his mission to Iran, in black
and white; printed in colour in 1832 by J. Arrowsmith, showing the islands in
the colour of Iranian territories
2- Map of The Gulf of Persia;
compiled in 1829 by Captain G. B. Brucks on the instructions of East India
Company, in which the islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa are coloured as Iranian
territories and named in the covering note as Iranian
owned.
3- Map of Central Asia Comprising
Cabool, Persia, the River Indus and countries eastward to it: compiled in
1834 by Lieutenant Alexander Burnes on the basis of 'Authentic Maps', printed by
Arrowsmith in colour, showing the islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa in the colour of
Iranian territories.
4- Map of Limits of the
activities of the Tribes of Pearling Coasts, compiled in 1835 by Captain S.
Hennell, showing the islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa within Iranian jurisdiction.
5- Map of Limits of the
activities of the Tribes of Pearling Coasts, compiled in 1838 by Major
Morrison, British Political resident in the Persian
Gulf, showing the islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa within Iranian
jurisdiction.
6- Map of The Persian Gulf, compiled
by Captain C.B.S. St. John, under the auspices of the Indian Government,
Bombay 1876, in
which the Tunbs and Abu Musa are depicted in the same colour as the Iranian
mainland.
Gun Battle at Greater
Tunb
There are those who describe the process
of actual transfer of sovereignty control of the islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa
to Iran by means of hoisting Iranian flags on them by an Iranian naval unit in
the morning of November 30, 1971, as "Iran's military occupation" of these
islands. What these individuals conveniently ignore is the fact that hoisting
the flags of the recipient state over the territory, the sovereignty control of
which is being transferred from one state to another, is a normal legal
practice. For instance the district of Alaska was ceded to the
United States by
Russia on March 30, 1867, but it was
the US Navy that started governing the territory by hoisting US flag there in
1879.
The Iranian flag was unfurled on the
two Tunb islands and Abu Musa
Island in the morning of
November 30, 1971 in an official arrangement with the British authorities and
the authorities of the emirates of Sharjah and Ras al-Kheimah. An Iranian Naval
unit arrived in Abu Musa
Island first and was
officially welcomed by H. H. Sheikh Saqar Bin Mohammad al-Qassemi, brother of
the ruler of Sharjah.
Unlike the peaceful transfer of
sovereignty control of northern half of Abu Musa
Island to Iran, an
unexpected incident at Greater Tunb disturbed peaceful transition.
On their arrival at Greater Tunb the
Iranian naval representative noticed the absence of welcoming party but the
small island seemed to them peaceful enough. On the approach to the island
Iranian officials on board naval vessel Artmiss heard gun shots from the
inside of Ras al-Kheimah's police station in the island. In an interview with
this author on 21 June 2003, Iranian journalist Mr. Ali-Reza Taheri, who
represented the daily Ettelaat of Tehran in the Iranian delegation on board
Artmiss to the three islands, stated:
It had been arranged that like in
Abu Musa, the Iranian delegation would be welcomed at Greater Tunb
ceremonially..... The Iranian delegation would not even contemplate that peaceful
process and their security would be threatened by the police force inside the
police station (of Ras al-Kheimah at the Greater Tunb). Captain Suzanchi headed
four navy personnel who attempted to investigate the source of disturbance, were
so sure of their safety that none of them had a naked gun in their hands when
they were killed. On his martyrdom Captain Suzanchi's gun was still in its case
fastened on his vest. At the heat of the gun shots had only his walky-talky in
his hand.
The Iranian delegation had no
knowledge of the number of police officers in the station. The two individuals,
who had come out of the station initially, had raised their guns over their
heads indicating their intention to surrender. Thinking that these two were the
only personnel there and that there would not be anyone else in the station
Captain Suzanchi and his company approached the individuals surrendering
themselves to the Iranian delegation. As soon as they reached the fire range of
the station, they were showered with bullets coming from the inside of the
station..... Captain Suzanchi and two of his fellow officers were killed on the
spot the forth officer was wounded with only one of them survived unscathed.
Facing that unexpected situation
which was later blamed on the British officer in command of Ras al-Kheimah's
police station in Greater Tunb, the Iranian naval unit reacted in the defense of
the lives of the rest of delegation and the safety of the local residents by brought the police
station under fire. Three of the rebelled Ras al-Kheimah officers inside the
building were killed and the rest were arrested and transferred to Ras
al-Kheimeh.....
This incident that was not
anticipated at all and was blamed on the lack of competence on the part of the
British and Ras al-Kheimah authorities at Greater Tunb has apparently provided
those opposed to the Anglo-Iranian settlement of the case of these islands to
accuse Iran of having occupied the islands
in question by force of arm. This accusation has been repeated many times in
certain Arab and Western circles without the offer of any evidence or credible
explanation to support the allegation and/or being aware of what had exactly
happened in Abu Musa and in Greater Tunb on the day these islands were lawfully
returned to Iran.
On the legality of Abu Dhabi's claims on
Iranian islands the following arguments are worth noting
(24):
1- The islands of
Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa were returned to Iran on November 30th 1971 through
legal process, including the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, before
the state of the United Arab
Emirates was created and the Aal Nahyan took
its leadership. According to international regulations no state can defy the
agreements that had come into being before its creation unless such agreements
had been officially declared as null and void by the newly created state. Not
only did not the United Arab Emirates declare the arrangements arrived at by
Iran and Great Britain (acting as the government of emirates of Sharjah and Ras
al- Kheimah at the time) on the return of the three islands, but also the
Supreme Council of the Union decided in its meeting of 12 May 1992 that foreign
obligations of the emirates prior to the formation of the United Arab Emirates
will be the obligations of the Union itself. Moreover, in its circular of 27
October 1992, distributed among the representatives of member states of the
United Nations, Abu Dhabi asked Iran to observe the terms of its November 1971
MoU with Sharjah. Hence, laying claims on islands returned to
Iran before the formation of
the United Arab Emirates
through legal process is an illegal act by Abu Dhabi.
2- The MoU of
November 1971, signed between Iran and Sharjah, is a legal
instrument which gives no right of interference to any third party. Also the
return of the two Tunb islands to Iran by Great
Britain took place on the basis of unwritten understanding
between the two as Iran deemed that any written
agreement would put her absolute sovereignty over these islands in doubt.
Nonetheless, the permanent representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations declared in
the Security Council meeting of December 9, 1971 that the arrangement arrived at
between his country and Iran on these islands constituted a
model arrangement for the settlement of similar territorial issues elsewhere in
the world. Hence, Abu
Dhabi's lack of respect for these arrangements renders
its claims on these islands illegal.
3- In the meeting
of 12 may 1992 of the Supreme Council of the United Arab Emirates the Emir of
Sharjah who is Iran's original partner in the 1971 MoU, refused to pass his
Emirate's authority over the issue of Abu Musa island to the UAE leadership and
left the meeting. Hence, Abu Dhabi's action in
assuming authority for the case of Abu
Musa Island in the absence of the ruler of Sharjah and
without his consent renders any claim by Abu Dhabi on that island
illegal.
4- In an insincere manner
Abu Dhabi is trying to present the practice of
the return of Abu Musa and Tunb islands to Iran on November
30th 1971 as a military occupation. In its scenario the visit
to Abu Musa island of an Iranian naval vessel that went there to hoist the
Iranian flag on the island was enough a reason to manufacture the accusation of
an Iranian military occupation of the island, disregarding the fact that in the
island the Iranian naval representatives were welcomed officially by the brother
of the Emir of Sharjah. Hoisting the flag of the recipient state on the
territory changed hand between two states is a legal practice as
US navy hoisted that
country's flag at Alaska when that territory
was transferred to US
sovereignty from Russia.
At Greater Tunb a misunderstanding
between the English commander of the police station and some Iraqi elements
there resulted in shooting between them. In a swift response, the Iranian naval
vessel that had just arrived to hoist Iranian flag there arrested those involved
and sent them back to Ras al-Kheimah. Clearly the attempt by Abu Dhabi in portraying this local incident at Greater Tunb
and the official welcome extended to the Iranian representatives at Abu Musa as
Iran's military
occupation of the three islands will demonstrate the falsehood nature of
its claims on these islands.
5- Finally, the
European Union aught to know that no country is under obligation to refer to
international judicial arbitration a territorial claim by another country which
is based on lack of awareness of and respect for international laws and
regulations.
Letter of Clarification from
Sharjah
In a letter to this author,
completely unrelated to Abu Dhabi's efforts in re-writing the history and
geographical description of the region in order to give some kind of legitimacy
to their illegitimate claims, dated 8 May 2006, the Dewan Al-Amiri, the Court of
His Highness Dr. Sheikh Sultan Al-Qasemi the Ruler of Sharjah clarified that the
Sheikh Yusof of Bandar Lengeh mentioned in pages 69 and 70 of my book "The
Islands of Tunb and Abu Musa (SOAS, University of London Publication 1995) and
on pages 184 and 185 of my book "Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf
(Curzon Press publication - London 1999), who ruled Bandar Lengeh since 1878,
did not belong to the ruling Qassemi families of the emirates of Sharjah and Ras
Al Kheimah. The letter adds:
We would like to inform you that
Sheikh Youssuf does not belong to the Ruling Family neither in Sharjah Emirate
nor in Ras Al-Khaimah Emirate; rather, he was descending from a humble tribe and
was a follower and servant of Sheikh Ali Bin Khalifa Al-Qassimi, who murdered
the latter and became himself the ruler of Lingeh (25).
This author welcomes the above
letter of clarification from the office of His Highness the Ruler of Sharjah
with due respect and implements it in its future research works, but finds it
necessary to explain with humility that the nature of the said Sheikh Youssef's
family connection with the Al-Qassemi families of Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaimah
and/or the lack of it does not alter the facts described in the said pages of my
above mentioned books.
Notes and
References
1-
Keith McLahlan, The boundaries of
modern Iran, The SOAS/GRC Geopolitics Series 2, UCL Press, London 1994, p.
9.
2-
Thomas R. Mattair, The
Three Occupied UAE Islands: The Tunbs and Abu Musa,
The
Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, in English and Arabic, Abu Dhabi
2005. This is a UAE Government publication and the UAE Government emblem appears
on its cover page.
3-
J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the
Persian Gulf, Vol. I, India 1908, p.
625.
4-
J. B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian
Frontiers, London 1964, p.
18.
5-
John C. Wilkinson, Water and
Tribal Settlement in South-East Arabia, Oxford research Studies in Geography, Oxford 1977, p. 6.
6-
Rupert Hay, The Persian Gulf States, Washington 1959, pp.
3-4.
7-
This terrorist group (Al-Ahwaz) has,
with the permission of British Government, placed its headquarters in London where they had in
1980 carried out their well known attack on the Iranian Embassy and were
defeated by the British special anti-terrorist
squad.
8-
Edward Saeed, Orientalism,
Vintage Books, New
York 1979).
9-
Talal Adrisi, Sourat al-Iranian
fi al-kotob al-madresiyat al-Arabiyat (the image of Iranians in Arab school
books), in Khair ed-Din Hasseeb ed., Arab-Iranian Relations, Beirut 1996, p.
304.
10- See for example the
following instances:
Magdi Omar's interview in Al-Ahram
of Egypt on 21/6/2001
Abdul Monim Saeed in Al-Ahram of 23
December 2002.
Al-Anba' daily of
Kuwait wrote on 7 October 2003
Mohammad Abu Ali in Al-Sharq
al-Owsat of London 16/12/2004
Abd or-Rahman Rashed in Al-Sharq
al-Owsat on 1/1/2005
Sad Ibn Taflah former Kuwaiti
Minister of Culture and Information in Sharq al-Owsat of 1/1/2005 and in
15/1/2005
Dr. Hesham Al-Asmar in Al-Ahram of
Egypt 18 January
2005
Dr. Yaseen Suwaid in An-Nahar of
Lebanon and
Morocco on
7/1/2005
Dr. Foad Haddad in The Qods al-Arabi
of London on
26/1/2006
Sad Ibn Taflah former Kuwaiti
Minister of Culture and Information in Sharq al-Awsat of
4/3/2006.
11- J. W??????@free.fr, 09
January 2006 20:03:42`+0100
12- Sir Arnold T. Wilson, The Persian
Gulf, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 2nd publication,
1954, p. 22.
13- For details of
evidence and references on these developments see; Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh,
Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf, Curzon/ Routledge,
London
1999.
14- John C. Wilkinson,
The Julanda of Oman,
in the Journal of Oman, Vol.
1, London 1975,
p. 98.
15- For a thorough account of the early
developments of British colonial interference with the political geography of
the Persian Gulf, see British references such as: Arnold T. Wilson, op. cit.,
Sir Rupert hay, op. cit., Donald Hawley, The Trucial States, George Allen
& Unwin, London 1970, J. B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf,
1795-1880, classic and recent reprinted work, Oxford University Press 1968,
etc.
16- Document 15 of Majmueh-e Asnad-e
Farrokh Khan Amin ad-Doleh, The collection of the documents of Farrokh Khan
Amin ad-Doleh, the documents of the year 1274 H. Q. (1867), edited by Karim
Esfahanian, Tehran University Press, Tehran 1979, pp.
24-5.
17- It is noteworthy that
in a similar attempt for leasing Bandar Abbas from Iran's central authorities,
Saiyid Saeed bin Ahmad, Sultan of Muscat (Oman) wrote on 20 Shaban 1272 (26
April 1856) to the Shah declaring himself as a subject of the Government of
Iran. He renewed Oman's
traditional sovereignty linkage to Iran in terminologies as obscure as
it had been throughout the ages. For Persian and Arabic texts of this letter,
see: Majmu'eh-e Asnad-eDolatiy-e Iran = A Collection of Iranian
Government Documents, Vol. 6156.
18- Dr. Sayyed Mohammad Nufel, deputy
Secretary General of the Arab League and representative of the Egyptian
Government in the Human Rights Conference of 1969 in Tehran, in interview with Kayhan Daily of Tehran, No. 7420,
Wednesday 4, 2, 1347 H.S., corresponding with 22 April 1969.
19- For details of these
maps see; Appendix 1 of The Islands of Tunb and Abu Musa: An Iranian Argument
for Peace and Co-operation in the Persian Gulf, by Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh,
SOAS University of London publication, London 1995, pp. 86-88. This list is
reproduced in; Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, Security and territoriality in the
Persian Gulf: A Maritime Political geography, Curzon Press, London 1999, New York
2002.
20-
Confidential from National Iranian Oil Company to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, dated 21.7.1344 (13 October 1965): No. 7539/84,
p.1.
21-
Payvand Iran News,
10/015/02, Report of the International symposium on Modern Boundaries of
Iran "Problems and practices of
Iranian boundaries", http://www.payvand.com/news/02/oct/1053.html
22-
For more details see: Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, The Islands of Tunb and Abu
Musa; An Iranian Argument in Search of Peace and Co-operation in The Persian
Gulf, occasional paper No. 15, CNMES, SOAS, London University, London 1995,
ch. III.
23-
Denis Wright, The English Amongst the Persians, Heinemann, London 1977, p.
68.
24-
Payvand News Network,
http://www.payvand.com/news/04/jun/1102.html, Report of the author's letter to Javier Solana
of the European Union, 06/16/2004.
25- Official letter of clarification
received electronically from Mr. Rashid Ahmed Al-Sheikh, Director General of
Sharjah Ruler's Court, Al-Dean Al-Amir, Government of Sharjah, addressed to
Professor Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, dated 8 May 2006.
... Payvand News - 6/12/06 ... --
