Iran's Progress
in Mastering Nuclear Energy Sparks New Threats of Aggression
By Robert Johnson
In recent months Iran has made large
strides toward mastering nuclear technology. Alarmed by these advances, the
Bush administration and its European allies have stepped up their hostile actions and threats,
specifically:
·
Attempting
to prevent the entry into service of Iran's first nuclear power plant at Bushehr.
The Bushehr reactor will use nuclear fuel imported from Russia.
·
Attempting
to prevent Iran from developing the capacity to produce its own nuclear
fuel.
·
Preparing
to impose harsh new economic sanctions on the country.
·
Threatening
to attack Iran militarily if other means fail to achieve their aims.
The imperialist
powers are particularly incensed by their failure to halt Iran's steady progress
in learning how to enrich uranium, the key challenge in manufacturing fuel for
a nuclear reactor.
The focus of the
campaign against Iran is the accusation that it is developing nuclear
weapons, something that Iran vehemently denies. The country has been subjected to
years of intense scrutiny through intrusive on-site inspections of key nuclear facilities
and surveillance by satellite and other means. These have produced not an iota
of proof to support the accusation.
In fact, the
attempt to deprive Iran of access to nuclear energy is part and parcel of imperialism's
effort to restrict Iran's economic progress. This campaign against Iran has gone on ever
since the Iranian revolution of 1979.
For many years,
Iranians had chafed under the tyrannical dictatorship of the shah, a regime
supported by Washington that slavishly applied policies favoring the U.S. and its Western
European allies. In 1978 and 1979 millions of Iranians rose up in a massive
revolutionary uprising, overthrew the shah, and established a government that is
not beholden to Washington. Their example has set a powerful
example for all oppressed peoples. The imperialists have never forgiven the
Iranians for their "crime," and to this day they continue to display a
particular hatred of Iran and its people.
The government
that emerged from the 1979 revolution has pursued the narrow interests of Iran's capitalist class,
and over the last three decades this has imposed a particularly heavy price on
the country's toilers. Workers, students, women's rights advocates, and national
minorities have often suffered harsh repression by the regime, as have those
whose social and political views differ from those of the rulers.
Nevertheless, the
revolution and its aftermath profoundly altered Iranian society, opening new
avenues for the participation of the masses in social and political life and
the achievement of some major social gains. These advances are reflected in
aspects of the Iranian government's international and domestic policies. For
example, Iran stands in solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, and
it is a key obstacle to imperialism's campaign of military conquest in the Middle East. Above all,
imperialism aims to crush the working people of Iran and their ability
to continue struggling for their demands, in solidarity with other fighters
around the world.
A long struggle
to harness nuclear energy
A technician working at the uranium conversion
plant in Esphahan (Isfahan)
The striking
advances in nuclear technology that Iran has made recently are important
achievements not only for the Iranian people but also for all those who have an
interest in seeing this technology cease to be the exclusive property of a
handful of powerful states and their chosen friends.
Iran's attempt to harness
nuclear energy predates its 1979 revolution.
During the shah's
rule, the U.S. and its Western European allies induced Tehran to embrace
nuclear power. An extensive program was begun with the goal of eventually
building more than 20 nuclear reactors to generate electricity. Steps were also
taken toward developing nuclear weapons. Shortly after the shah was overthrown,
the Iranian government halted all of these projects.
Before long, Iran, now an Islamic
republic, became the target of U.S.-led economic sanctions; these sanctions have
had a particularly crippling effect on Iran's oil industry. Today Iran produces 4.0
million barrels of oil a day, well below the total of 5.5 million produced
before 1979. A 1998 study concluded that 57 of Iran's 60 major oil
fields need major repairs and upgrading. This will require investments of some
$40 billion over a 15-year period. (1) Moreover, despite its large energy
resources, Iran is a net importer of gasoline and other refined petroleum
products.
Some 38% of the
country's oil output is consumed domestically, primarily to generate electricity.
(2) While the country's oil production has declined since 1979, its population
has more than doubled, to 70 million today. The need for electrical power is
acute; demand is growing by 7% to 8% annually.
According to one
expert, if current trends in energy consumption continue, within a few years Iran will become a
net importer of oil. He notes that this would be "a gigantic catastrophe for a
country which relies on oil for 80% of her foreign currency and 45% of her
total annual budget. If that happens, how will Iran be able to feed
her population, estimated to reach 100 million by 2025, and also spend on her
development and national security? The fact is that, despite considerable
efforts over the past 30 years, Iran's industrial output, aside from her oil
industry, accounts for only 15% of her gross domestic product." (3)
Nuclear power is
not Iran's only option to
increase its supply of electricity. The country has the second-largest reserves
of natural gas in the world, and gas-fired generation plants can be built
relatively quickly and cheaply. But Iranian authorities emphasize that their
country needs to diversify its sources of energy and to limit the consumption
of hydrocarbons, both for environmental reasons and to conserve these resources
for sale on the international market. In the long term Iran, like other
major energy exporters, aims to develop value-added industries that use its oil
and gas as feedstock.
Iran's policy of
energy diversification through nuclear power is no different from the routine
practice of other, more powerful states. Russia and the United States are the world's first
and third largest producers of crude oil respectively, yet they use nuclear
power to produce between 15 and 20% of their electricity. Canada, another major
oil producer, generates 16% of its electricity from nuclear plants (4) (5). By
these standards Iran's goal is relatively modest: it aims to produce approximately
10% of its electricity, 7,000 megawatts, through nuclear power by 2020. This
would require building six nuclear power plants in addition to the one at
Bushehr.
To meet its acute
need for more electricity, Iran must choose from the technologies currently
available. Nuclear power certainly has its costs and hazards, but so do other
large-scale energy sources. As a sovereign country Iran has every right
to make its own policy choices in this field. Its right to develop nuclear
power is affirmed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty whose signatories
include Iran and the major
world powers (among them the very powers that are attempting to block Iran's access to
nuclear energy).
Iranian society contains
within it a diverse spectrum of opinions on many issues. But there is a broad
national consensus on the country's need for nuclear power and on its sovereign
right to this technology.
The battle for
Bushehr
Bushehr nuclear power plant
Iran's first nuclear
power plant at Bushehr is nearly ready to go into service. The inauguration of
the plant will mark a major step forward for the Iranian people who have
invested a great deal of effort and large sums of money over many years to
bring it to fruition. Victory is tantalizingly close, yet the outcome still
hangs in the balance. In fact, the saga of this plant illustrates the many
obstacles that imperialism has erected to prevent Iran's progress.
Work began on the
Bushehr complex on the Persian Gulf coast some 30 years ago under the shah. In
1975 Siemens signed a contract to build two nuclear reactors on the site at a
cost of US$4 billion–$6 billion. But the German firm halted work and withdrew
from the project after the 1979 revolution. At that point one reactor was 85% complete;
the other was 50% complete. The following year Iraq invaded Iran, sparking a long
and bloody war during which Iraq repeatedly bombed the Bushehr plant,
destroying much of the key infrastructure. When the war ended in 1988, Iran asked Siemens to
complete the project, but it refused because of American pressure. Siemens would
not even provide Iran with the blueprints of the work that had been done
and paid for. U.S. opposition to Bushehr made it impossible for Iran to induce any
other Western company to undertake the project.
Finally, in January
1995 Russia agreed to help Iran build a 915
megawatt light water reactor for the plant. The cost to Iran was an estimated
US$800 million–$1 billion. The plant was scheduled to begin operating in 2000. A
separate contract signed in August 1995 provided for Russia to supply
nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor for 10 years. To allay fears of
proliferation of weapons-grade material, Iran agreed to return the spent reactor fuel
to Russia under the
supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an agency of the United
Nations. (Spent fuel contains the element plutonium which can serve as fuel for
an atomic bomb.)
Construction of
the plant has been beset with many technical problems and delays, but the work is
now nearly complete. Last year Russia agreed to ship uranium reactor fuel to Bushehr
by March 2007 and to open the plant in September. Electricity generation was
scheduled to begin in November. Russia subsequently announced that the
fuel for Bushehr was in storage and could be shipped to Iran within days of a
decision by the relevant authorities. Everything seemed to be aligned for a
successful launch of the power plant before the end of this year.
U.S. threats
against Bushehr, Moscow's betrayal
Iranian soldiers at an
anti-aircraft defense position inside the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz.
The facility would be a prime target of any military
But in recent
months, as work on Bushehr neared completion, the U.S. has pulled out
all the stops to prevent its operation. It refuses to accept the assurances from
Iran and Russia concerning the
spent fuel. The international media have carried many deliberately leaked
reports about plans by the U.S. or Israel to bomb the site before the
reactor is loaded with nuclear fuel and begins operation. (The consequences of attacking
an operating reactor are so extreme that under present circumstances such an
operation seems rather unlikely.)
Parallel to these
threats, the U.S. and its European allies have worked fiercely behind the
scenes to dissuade Russia from collaborating with Iran on Bushehr. For
some time Moscow resisted the pressure, while attempting to force Iran to bend to
imperialist demands, particularly those related to Iran's production of
nuclear fuel. However, as the U.S. escalated its threats and pressure in
recent months, the Kremlin changed course. It decided to placate Washington by reneging on
its signed agreements with Iran.
On March 17 the New
York Times reported that "Russia has informed Iran that it will withhold
nuclear fuel for Iran's nearly completed Bushehr power plant unless Iran
suspends its uranium enrichment as demanded by the United Nations Security
Council. European, American and Iranian officials said. …
"Russian
officials have acknowledged that Russia is delaying the delivery of fuel
to the reactor in the port city of Bushehr. The officials attributed the
delay to the failure of Iran to pay what it owes, not on nuclear proliferation
concerns.
"But last month,
Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov informed some European officials that Russia had made a
political decision not to deliver the fuel, adding that Russia would state
publicly that the sole reason was financial, European officials said." (6)
This report was
confirmed on July 25 when a Russian firm working on Bushehr announced that the
reactor would not be ready before autumn 2008. The public announcement, made on
the day that an Iranian delegation arrived in Moscow for further negotiations
over Bushehr, preempted the negotiations. Iranians naturally reacted to the
news with shock and anger.
The Russian claim
that the delay is due to a dispute over payments is ludicrous. There is no
conceivable reason why Iran, having invested so much effort and money in the
project, would stop paying its bills just as the plant neared completion. The
Iranians flatly deny the claim and say that they are prepared to publish the
record of their payments to the Russian nuclear subcontractors.
The ultimate fate
of Bushehr is now unclear. It is already seven years behind schedule. Iran's need for more
electric power is urgent and the inability to add new power from Bushehr to the
national grid for some time to come is a serious blow to the Iranian economy.
Iranian authorities are quoted in some reports as saying that they are prepared
to complete the construction of the plant without Russian participation. Even
if this is technically feasible, in the short term there appears to be no other
source to which Iran can turn to obtain fuel for the reactor.
Iranian
commentators have also drawn a link between Russia's decision on Bushehr and an
offer that it made to the U.S. a few months earlier. To dissuade Washington from installing
antimissile systems in Eastern Europe close to Russia, Russian
president Vladimir Putin offered to share information on Iran's missile
capabilities with the U.S. The source of the data is a giant Russian-operated radar
station in Azerbaijan, a country on Iran's northern border. Iran sharply
protested the Russian proposal which would have undermined the country's
ability to defend itself. Unwilling to abandon his antimissile plans for Eastern Europe, President
George W. Bush declined Putin's offer.
The other flash
point: Iran's production of nuclear fuel
The second major
point of contention between Iran and the imperialist powers has been Iran's insistence that
it has the right to manufacture the fuel for nuclear reactors domestically.
Through years of negotiations with many twists and turns, Iran has steadfastly
insisted on this right as a matter of principle.
Iran's experience
with Russia on the Bushehr
project certainly illustrates the risks of depending on outside sources to
provide fuel for its reactors. It makes no sense for Iran to build seven
Bushehr-type reactors by 2020 without ensuring a reliable source of fuel for
them. There is also an economic consideration. The small number of suppliers
who control the world market for nuclear fuel charge high prices because of
their virtual monopoly. One of Iran's long-term goals is to become an
exporter of nuclear fuel.
Iran has all of the
prerequisites for producing nuclear fuel: domestic sources of uranium, a highly
skilled workforce of engineers and technicians, and an economy large enough to
support the necessary investments in plants and equipment.
To manufacture
fuel for a reactor like the one at Bushehr, the uranium found in nature must
undergo a sequence of complex industrial processing. The key step is enriching
the uranium — that is, increasing the proportion of the U-235 isotope in
uranium from 0.7%, the amount found in nature, to at least 3.5%. The process
poses some extremely difficult technical challenges.
The most common
technique for enrichment is to feed a uranium compound in gaseous form into a
large number of centrifuges which spin the gas at an extremely high speed. Because
of the slight difference in weight of the two uranium isotopes, U-235 and
U-238, centrifugal forces tend to separate the gas containing the different isotopes.
The proportion of U-235 increases very slightly in each operation. To attain the
desired level of concentration, thousands of centrifuges must be connected
together and their operation carefully coordinated.
Not surprisingly,
Iran began its
uranium enrichment activities in secret. According to various sources, in 1987
it began buying drawings and parts for centrifuges from Abdul Qadeer Khan, the
Pakistani nuclear expert. International inspectors say the deals eventually
included parts for about 500 primitive used centrifuges.
But Tehran apparently was
dissatisfied with their quality, so in 1995 it bought an entire plant of thousands
of centrifuges from Russia. Moscow subsequently cancelled the deal,
responding to pressure from the Clinton administration. Iran then set out on
the more difficult route of developing the technology on its own. It began reproducing
and enhancing large numbers of centrifuges based on Khan's designs. It also
started building a large uranium enrichment plant at Natanz. The pilot factory
there was to house 1,000 centrifuges; the main plant would shelter 50,000 machines.
This facility has been built deep under ground to protect it from aerial
attack.
Iran still faces many
technical hurdles before it can enrich sufficient quantities of uranium to
power a reactor. But the speed with which it has overcome obstacles has
surprised many observers. This demonstration of scientific and engineering
prowess is a source of pride for many Iranians.
On May 15 the New York Times reported that
"inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency have concluded that Iran
appears to have solved most of its technological problems and is now beginning
to enrich uranium on a far larger scale than before, according to the agency's
top officials. The findings may change the calculus of diplomacy in Europe
and in Washington, which has aimed to force a suspension of Iran's
enrichment activities in large part to prevent it from learning how to produce
weapons-grade material."
The Times quoted the director general of the
international energy agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, as saying, "We believe they
pretty much have the knowledge about how to enrich. … From now on, it is simply
a question of perfecting that knowledge. People will not like to hear it, but
that's a fact." (7)
A subsequent
report cited a UN official as saying that by mid-June Iran had 2,000
centrifuges on line and was on pace for 3,000 by July. (8) This would be a
giant step toward enriching uranium on the industrial scale necessary to fuel a
nuclear reactor. On July 6 ElBaradei reported that the pace of expansion had
slowed. There are likely further technical challenges to be overcome, but as
ElBaradei noted, the overall direction is clear: Iran is increasingly acquiring
the necessary expertise. Time does not favour those who want to deprive Iran of access to
nuclear technology.
Growing threat of
imperialist aggression
For this very
reason, the threat of an imperialist attack on Iran is very real.
The July 19 issue of The Economist, a magazine that is an influential
voice in shaping imperialist policy, expressed its concerns in these terms:
"The mild sanctions imposed so far are not working, and now the technological
clock in Natanz is outrunning the diplomatic clock at the United Nations. Iran may soon work
out how to spin its centrifuges at full speed for long periods; and once it
learns how to do that the odds of stopping it from building a bomb will rapidly
lengthen. This suggests that a third sanctions resolution, with sharper teeth,
needs to be enacted without delay." (9)
Harsh new economic
sanctions such as a ban on shipments of gasoline to Iran could potentially
devastate the country's economy. But this is not the only threat facing
Iranians. Notwithstanding the crisis the U.S. faces over its occupation of Iraq
and the widespread antiwar sentiment in the American population, Washington and
Tel Aviv are seriously considering a military attack on Iran if that is the
only way that they can reverse Iran's nuclear progress. The consequences of
such aggression, whether economic or military — or both — are likely to be
far-reaching. But so too, from their perspective, are the consequences of
failing to act and allowing Iran to achieve its goals.
The stakes are
equally large for working people. We must vigorously defend Iran's right to
nuclear energy. We must also be vigilant and ready to mobilize against the
threat of new measures against Iran, whatever their form.
(A forthcoming
article will discuss the claim that Iran is attempting to
develop nuclear weapons.)
References
(1) Iran's Nuclear
Program: Part II: Are Nuclear Reactors Necessary? by Muhammad Sahimi, Payvand,
Oct.
3, 2003.
http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1022.html.
(2) Iran, Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, May 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html. Estimated
production in 2004 and 2005.
(3) M. Sahimi,
ibid
(4)
Oil Market Report, International Energy Agency, July 13, 2007, p.
42, http://omrpublic.iea.org/currentissues/full.pdf.
Crude oil production during June 2007.
(5) Power Reactor
Information System, International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/index.html
(6) "Russia Gives Iran Ultimatum on
Enrichment", Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, March 19, 2007
(7) "Inspectors
Cite Big Gain by Iran on Nuclear Fuel", David E. Sanger, New York Times,
May
15, 2007
(8) "IAEA Warns
Of Iran Atomic Risk Amid
EU - Tehran Talks", Reuters,
June
11, 2007
(9) The Riddle of
Iran, The
Economist, July 19, 2007. http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9514293
-30-
Robert
Johnson is a contributing editor of
Socialist Voice (http://www.socialistvoice.com/)
