By Nader Bagherzadeh, UC, Irvine
Since the UN Security Council's
Resolution 1737, which was unanimously passed on Saturday Dec 23rd,
has a specified 60 day deadline for Iran's response, ignoring it will force the
Security Council to revisit the issue and increase the level of sanctions
against Iran. Although, experts believe that tougher
economic sanctions will be hard to approve given the reluctance of
China, Russia, and some European countries, but it will
be wishful thinking for Iran to assume that it is unlikely to
happen. Therefore, there are
three options that Iran can consider for its uranium
enrichment fuel cycle aspirations in light of last week's UNSC Resolution
1737.
The least confrontational approach
is to accept the position that US has always wanted in the past two decades and
most likely will be the hardened position of the new administration for 2008 and
beyond. And that is for
Iran to stay a member of NPT
(Nonproliferation Treaty) and honor all the intrusive inspections which come
with the Additional Protocol and allow even more flexibility if needed, but at
the same time abandon the nuclear fuel cycle activities for ever, or at least
the most sensitive portion as it relates to enrichment. Thus, Iran will become
the first recognized member of NPT that does not benefit from Article IV
(Article IV recognizes the inalienable right of NPT members for developing
peaceful nuclear technology).
Ironically, the five nuclear weapon club members of this treaty continue
to expand and modernize their weapon systems without honoring Article VI that
was put in place for complete elimination of these weapons. If Iran chooses this approach, US may agree to
uranium conversion steps in Isfahan, where uranium gas (UF6) is created
from the yellow cake powder, but the Natanz facility that is designed for
enrichment of UF6 to the level needed for a nuclear power reactor has to be
mothballed for ever. This is more
along the line of what South
Korea is doing right now with their fuel cycle
activities.
The second choice for
Iran is to suspend all fuel
cycle activities, as expected from UNSC Resolution 1737 and start a long and
tedious political jostling that could go on for years, hoping to have the IAEA
certify Iran's nuclear fuel cycle facilities
for peaceful purposes. This process
for Japan took about 5 years,
and experts have suggested that given the past ambiguities dealing with
Iran's dossier, this may take at
least 10 years to complete. As it
has been suggested, after IAEA completes its evaluation and certification, US
probably will demand Iran's
nuclear dossier to be approved by the Security Council, delaying it even more
and most likely use its veto power to block it for a long time, inter alia,
complaining about Iran's economical justifications for
needing this technology. Even if
Iran receives its final approval with possible abstains from UK and US in the
Security Council having pursued this second option, since Resolution 1737
demands suspension of all research and development activities, it will have to
start around 2017 with a very old technology that is no longer economically
feasible or practical. If
Iran is only after a "grand bargain"
with US to solve all the economic and security issues and not seriously
interested in mastering a complete nuclear fuel cycle, then this is probably the
optimum approach.
The last option is to have
Iran's IAEA representative in
Vienna submit the required 90 day notice for
withdrawing from NPT, but remain a member of IAEA, as is the case for
India. This is probably the only sure way
to guarantee immediate continuation of work on all aspects of the nuclear fuel
cycle. If Iran is truly
serious about its nuclear aspirations and not looking for bargaining chips, as
it relates to its decades of confrontation with US, then this is the only way
forward. However, this final
approach carries with it serious confrontation with the Security Council and
makes approval of sanctions under Article 39 of the Council probable which
includes military enforcement.
Since the next US primary
presidential elections will begin in earnest in late 2007, the first half of
2007 will be a deciding factor for the Bush Administration in dealing with
Iran's nuclear technology.
Iran's nuclear case has been a long
and difficult road that may shape the future of NPT, as far as non-nuclear
countries are concerned, and will have a profound impact for the structure of
the proposed nuclear fuel suppliers group.
This is a group of dozen countries that are only allowed to make nuclear
fuel; forcing others to abandon their nuclear fuel development plans and become
a costumer of this group for their needs, creating a cartel for this fuel
source, similar to the OPEC cartel.
The most constructive way forward is
to go along the line of Option 2 with an understanding that long and protracted
negotiation and certification phases by IAEA will demonstrate to
Iran the insincerity of this
approach. By including fixed and
short timelines--months and not years--for gradual certification of Iranian
nuclear sites this should be a mutually beneficial approach that could bring
both sides back to the negotiation table.
About the author: Nader Bagherzadeh, is a Professor of
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the University of California, Irvine.
He has been following Iran's nuclear issues, and given
talks and written articles on that subject.
