By
Arshin
Adib-Moghaddam
Recently,
officials in Washington D.C., London, and Paris have claimed that, for ordinary
Iraqis, the security situation has been improved by the surge in U.S. troops.
However, the Iraqi people continue to suffer, with thousands dead, millions
injured, and millions more displaced. What led to this anarchic situation and
how can it be contained?
MANY
DECISION-MAKERS IN PARIS,
London and Washington DC point out that the surge in US troop numbers has
improved the security situation of ordinary Iraqis. True, in the past few months
terrorist bombings and the number of Iraqi casualties have declined in
comparison to the same period in the past five years.
But
Iraqis continue to die, albeit at a slower rate than before. Conservative
estimates set the number of civilian deaths between 82.000 and 90.000 ([1]
Iraq Body Count). Others put the figures much higher: between 650.000 ([2]
Lancet Study) and 1,2 million ([3]
Opinion Research Business). In addition, approximately 2 million Iraqis have
been maimed and injured and over 2,2 million dispersed to other countries
primarily to Syria, Jordan and Iran.
A
quick mathematical deduction reveals that since the invasion one third of the
overall Iraqi population were killed, maimed or forced to flee their homeland.
LACK
OF STRUCTURAL SECURITY
Even
for the most purblind it should be evident that there is no viable equilibrium
in the country. Iraq continues to be anarchic; "In an anarchic situation, where
the state is incapable to exercise its monopoly of violence, ethnic affiliations
become the main sources of security" not at least because the army and the
police do not have the institutional outreach and authority to guarantee the
security of the populace. Amidst this anarchic situation that grew out of an
ill-conceived and incompetently managed occupation, a quasi-state has
established itself under the leadership of [4]
Nuri al-Maliki. It is a quasi state because al-Maliki's government
struggles to assert its sovereignty beyond the [5]
Green Zone, whose physical detachment from the rest of Baghdad with
fortified walls and rows and rows of barbwire symbolises the isolation of the
country's leadership.
The
sovereignty of the Iraqi state is constrained because it can not exercise its
monopoly of violence throughout the country; it is unable to guarantee its own
security. This is exemplified by its support for a continued presence of US
troops, of course. But it is also reflected in the recent invasion of the
Kurdish areas in Northern Iraq by the Turkish army in pursuit of the Kurdistan
Workers' Party ([6]
PKK) rebels. The very fact that the Iraqi state could not avert a direct
invasion by an outside force indicates its inability to secure its borders.
This
lack of structural security and the absence of effective state institutions have
exacerbated ethnic divisions. "The Mahdi Militia has strengthened its military
and political capabilities in order to position itself at the centre of Iraqi
politics after the occupation" In an anarchic situation, where the state is
incapable to exercise its monopoly of violence, ethnic and tribal affiliations
become the main sources of security and identification. Thus an ideational war
of attrition becomes inevitable explaining why all stakeholders in the Iraqi
polity are engaged in it: Shia groups with close ties to Iran, including the [7]
Mahdi militia under the command of [8]
Moqtada al-Sadr; some of the Sunni groups allied to al-Qaeda and partially
financed by sympathisers in Saudi Arabia; and remnants of the Ba'thist
dictatorship who have huddled together with al-Qaeda type parties in
order to fight against the Shia militias, moderate Sunni groups, tribal leaders,
the Kurdish factions, and the government of Nuri al-Maliki itself.
It
should be noted that Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Ba'thist loyalists have been
seriously weakened, because they failed to secure structural support amongst
ordinary Iraqis and because they have been targeted by the US Army. Moqtada
al-Sadr is playing a clever game here anticipating that the ceasefire agreement
with the Coalition Forces (which he recently prolonged) will increase the
pressure on Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Ba'thist loyalists. In the meantime, his
Mahdi Militia has strengthened its military and political capabilities in order
to position itself at the centre of Iraqi politics after the occupation.
PLAYING THE ANTI-IRANIAN CARD
The
anarchic situation in Iraq is a direct outcome of the war and the inability of
both the al-Maliki government and the Bush Administration to promote viable
security structures within the country that would be strong enough to extend the
sovereignty of the state beyond the Green Zone. "President Bush and
Vice-President Cheney have repeatedly played the anti-Iranian card in order to
rally regional states behind their foreign policy agenda" In light of these
realities only the most ardent supporters of the invasion continue to deny that
the Iraq war has been a disaster of historic proportions, both in terms of the
ineffable terror it unleashed on the Iraqi people (in Falluja, in Abu Ghraib, in
Haditha) and in terms of the US foreign policy agenda in the region and beyond.
They
should note that most Iraqis continue to favour a complete US troop withdrawal.
In this sense the US has already lost the war. It is also indicative that the
current Iraqi government (as much as [9]
Hamid Karzai in Kabul for that matter) has close ties to Iran. On his recent
visit to Baghdad, President Ahmadinejad signed over a dozen agreements in the
political, cultural and economic sectors. It is rather ironic that we are told
that this is a negative development; that Iraqis should distrust Iranians; that
the Persians have always betrayed the Arabs; that it would be better to
rekindle the myth of endemic Persian-Arab enmity; that this would serve the
balance of power in the region. Not unlike Saddam Hussein, President Bush
and Vice-President Cheney have repeatedly played the anti-Iranian card in order
to rally regional states behind their foreign policy agenda and to refocus the
attention away from Israel's occupation. "Trying to blame Iran for the dismal
situation in Iraq may serve the purpose to sell further sanctions against the
country to a reluctant international community" Yet thus far the policy has
backfired, not at least because Arab and Muslim public opinion is reluctant to
trade anti-Israeli sentiments with animosity towards Iran.
Indeed the more the United States demonizes Iran, the more opportunity it gives
the Iranian state to capitalise on its opposition to US foreign policies in the
region. Who doubts that in the case of a military showdown that would pit the
United States and Israel against the Islamic Republic, the latter could easily
mobilise Muslim and international public opinion behind it? Those who do are
hard put to explain why Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has more supporters in Caracas,
Cairo, Istanbul, Damascus, Beirut and Havana than he has in Tehran, Isfahan and
Shiraz.
In
my opinion trying to blame Iran for the dismal situation in Iraq may serve the
purpose to sell further sanctions against the country to a reluctant
international community. But it does not address the sources of anarchy in Iraq
which emerged out of the incorrigible decision to invade the country without an
explicit UN mandate and without a viable post-war strategy to manage the
occupation. Anarchy in Iraq was imported; it grew out of the incompetence of the
Bush/Blair administrations. It is incredulously hypocritical to blame regional
states for trying to contain the spill-over of the war after having invaded the
country without an explicit international mandate. Turkey's cities and civilians
have been bombed repeatedly by the PKK and Iran fought an eight year war against
Saddam Hussein at a time when he was the darling of the Reagan and Thatcher
administrations. Both states must consider it to be in their national interest
to contain the security threats emanating from the anarchic situation on their
doorstep.
NO
FUTURE STRATEGY FOR THE COUNTRY
"The
Iraqi state can only extend its sovereignty in a situation where its legitimacy
is accepted by the most important political constituencies" Yet the Bush
administration remains intransigently oblivious to these regional parameters.
What makes matters worse is that there is no future strategy for the country.
The surge may have pacified some sections of Baghdad, but there is no
concerted political will behind it. Alleviating the security dilemma of the
Iraqi quasi-state and extending its sovereignty requires a two tiered approach;
Janus faced, in other words, one side addressing the internal security
situation, the other side facing outwards towards the region.
The
Iraqi state can only extend its sovereignty in a situation where its legitimacy
is accepted by the most important political constituencies within the country.
Currently this is not the case. The Kurds have extended their autonomy in
Northern Iraq, exemplified by their attempts to negotiate oil deals directly
with international companies. "What is needed is an inclusive diplomatic
campaign spearheaded by the United Nations, the European Union and the United
States that would bring the major regional powers to the negotiating table"
Sunni groups point to the sectarian nature of the government of Nuri al-Maliki
that is primarily dominated by Shia parties. Only a campaign for national
reconciliation under the supervision of the UN can tie the alienated factions to
the political process and give them a shared stake in the future of the country;
not at least because within such a context Iraqis could renegotiate what it
means to be Iraqi in the first place.
The
second tier needs to address the regional dimension of the conflict. There are
too many stakeholders that are left out of the security equation. Paradoxically,
Saudi Arabia, the United States' staunch ally in the Persian Gulf, currently
does not even have an embassy in Baghdad, while Iran, the big bogeyman of
the neo-conservative establishment in Washington, has had several negotiations
with the United States over the security situation in Iraq.
What
is needed is an inclusive diplomatic campaign spearheaded by the United Nations,
the European Union and the United States that would bring the major regional
powers such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria to the negotiating table.
This would extend the international bargaining power of the Iraqi quasi-state
and increase its legitimacy in the wider Arab worlds. Ideally, it would seek to
build on the smallest common security denominator that all stakeholders in the
conflict can agree upon: preventing the disintegration of the Iraqi nation-state
into three warring entities.
ESCAPE WITHOUT LOSING FACE
"The
ultimate purpose of the current deliberations is to escape from the quagmire
without losing face" Every Iraqi has the absolute right to accuse me of
idealised armchair philosophising. I am aware that the reality on the ground for
the millions of Iraqis directly affected by this atrocious war looks rather
differently than from my office here at the [10]
SOAS campus on Russell Square in London. But I would add that most
decision-makers sitting in the State Department at Foggy Bottom, Washington DC,
whose widely marketed job it has been to deliver liberty and democracy
to the Iraqi people, are even farther away from the realities in the country,
and, alas, increasingly so.
Decision-makers in the United States, Republican and Democratic, have learned
something from the disaster in Iraq: foreign policies do not have to have a
meaning, only a purpose. Whether it is the surge policy or the promise to
withdraw US troops, the ultimate purpose of the current deliberations is to
escape from the quagmire without losing face; to establish a context in
which the war can be sold as a victory (Bush used the term three times in his
recent speech on the five year anniversary of the invasion). Alas, nobody, apart
from a few Iraqi intellectuals, seriously deliberates about a bold diplomatic
initiative along the lines sketched above.
In
the meantime Iraq as a nation-state and as an idea remains suspended. Unless
there is a concerted international effort to reinvigorate it, the anarchic
political culture in the country will continue to engender its own destructive
dynamics. Mind you, it is within turbulent political periods far less anarchic
than the Iraqi one, that the Hitlers, Stalins and Saddams of this world were
born. It is only through a radical effort to alter the present situation, I am
convinced, that the possibility might be preserved of a future in which writing
the history of Iraq would no longer be an expression of sectarian loyalty or
vulgar ideological allegiance.
URLs in this post:
[1] Iraq Body Count:
http://www.iraqbodycount.org/
[2] Lancet Study:
http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf
[3] Opinion Research Business:
http://www.opinion.co.uk/
[4] Nuri al-Maliki:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki
[5] Green Zone:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_Zone
[6] PKK:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers_Party
[7] Mahdi:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahdi_Militia
[8] Moqtada al-Sadr:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moqtada_al-Sadr
[9] Hamid Karzai:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamid_Karzai
[10] SOAS :
http://www.soas.ac.uk/
Note: This article was
first published by
Safe Democracy Foundation:
http://english.safe-democracy.org
URL to article:
http://english.safe-democracy.org/2008/04/04/imported-anarchy-in-iraq/
... Payvand News - 05/05/08 ...
© Copyright 2008 NetNative
(All Rights Reserved)
|
|
#