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By Valentine M. Moghadam
(Source:
The Middle East Institute)
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The Iranian Revolution at 30
Source: The Middle East Institute
www.mideasti.org
This wide-ranging mega-collection of more than 50 original
essays is the first of a series of six similar publications
commemorating the events of 1979.
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The Iranian Revolution and its aftermath have generated many debates, one of
which pertains to the effects on women's labor force participation and
employment patterns. For over 20 years, Iran-born scholars have debated the
extent of women's post-revolutionary marginalization, emphasizing the impact of
ideology or economic policy. For some, Islamization led to women's labor
marginalization, while others have argued that Islamization - and its attendant
sex segregation - actually benefited women, in that conservative families
allowed their daughters to be educated and to seek work. The fact is that 30
years after the revolution, women constitute only 15% of the formal sector paid
labor force (that is, those entitled to paid holidays, maternity leave, pension,
and other provisions of labor law). According to the results of the 1385/2006
Iranian census, only 3.5 million Iranian women are salaried workers, compared
with 23.5 million men.
However much as Iranians as a
whole are doing well in terms of health, education, and social protection, the
presumed benefits of Islamization for women's advancement look meager when
compared to the social and gender indicators of other advanced developing
countries.
Women , Work , and the Global
Economy
The case of Iranian women's labor
force participation is usually made on its own terms but is best understood in a
comparative or international perspective, framed by theory. The globalization
literature and studies done within the Gender and Development (GAD) framework
show, on the basis of much evidence across the globe, that the employment
effects of globalization have differential effects on women and men in labor
markets depending on occupation and sector, and depending also on the nature of
the country's integration in the global economy (measured by, for example, trade
and foreign direct investment). "The feminization of labor" refers to both the
growing proportion of women in the labor force and the deterioration of work
conditions, as "flexible labor markets" become the order of the day. At the same
time, there has been a growing trend, for more educated women, of increasing
involvement in a variety of professional services, including finance, insurance,
and real estate jobs (the FIRE sector).
The GAD literature also
emphasizes the expansion of informal and unregistered work, which can be both
high-end and low-end. This includes desktop publishing, catering, making fancy
jams, designing jewelry, private language or music lessons, beauty services,
sewing and alteration; as well as food preparation, hawking, and producing
garments for a sub-contractor.
In this context, key questions
are: How does Iran compare to other countries with similar income levels and at
similar stages of economic development, such as Venezuela, Malaysia, China,
South Korea, Tunisia, or Brazil? How is Iran integrated in the global economy
and with what effects on labor-capital flows in general and women's labor force
participation in particular? Is Iran part of the global economy and globalizing
processes? If so, what have been the effects on women's labor force
participation, occupational distribution, and income? If not, perhaps that says
something about why Iranian women remain marginalized from the paid labor force.
Are women's low rates of labor force participation a result of systematic
discrimination (driven by both cultural norms and legal restrictions) or a
function of the nature of the Iranian economy? Or, conversely, is this a matter
of women's own choice and preference?
A number of authors have
emphasized Iranian women's educational attainment, arguing that women's
increasing university enrollments is a major achievement of the revolution. And
yet, the expansion of female education - including the smaller proportion of
adolescents in the work force and the larger share of women's university
enrollments - is a global phenomenon and cannot be attributed to Islamization.
The same is true with women's employment in services; in most medium- to high-
middle income developing countries, female labor has shifted from agriculture
and manufacturing to the services sector.
Women and Employment 30 Years
after the Revolution
The most recent Iranian census
(1385/2006) shows that the female share of the labor force is less than 20%,
considerably below the world average of 45%. (The census gives the figure of
18.5%, which is at odds with the 24.6% figure sometimes seen in international
data sets. It is also at odds with the higher figure in the Socio-Economic
Characteristics of Households panel data, produced by the Statistical Center of
Iran and used by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani.) Some 33% of Iran's female labor force
is in professional jobs, concentrated in education, healthcare, and social
services - hardly a seismic shift from the pre-revolutionary period in terms of
gender roles. Slightly over half of all teachers in Iran are women, but the
proportion of female university teaching staff is, at 20%, less than that of
Algeria (41%), Tunisia (40%), Turkey (38%), and Bahrain (36%). Iranian census
data reveal no evidence of a shift to the FIRE sector, and less than 4% of
employed women are found in senior or executive or managerial positions.
For the urban areas, the rather
small female labor force is about equally divided between private and public
sector employment. Just 20% of the urban female work force is in industrial
employment (compared to 45% of rural women). Some 50% of the female work force
is in professional and technical employment (54.5% with executive positions
included); 11% in administrative and clerical, and 10% in services and sales.
Extrapolating to discern patterns by social class, it appears that the vast
majority of urban working class women are either unemployed/seeking work;
economically inactive/housewives; or engaged in informal, home-based, or
voluntary activities. This would mean dependence on male kin for social
insurance and retirement benefits.
Dr.
Valentine M. Moghadam, Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies, Purdue
University
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Given high unemployment and
inflation in Iran, it is likely that the vast majority of non-employed women
engage in an array of high-end and low-end home-based economic activities
described above. Thirty years after the Iranian revolution, we have yet to see a
systematic study of the informal sector in Iran, or a survey of the services
performed by women from their homes. We know from anecdotal evidence that the
practice of mahr/mehrieh, whereby the groom promises an amount of money
to his bride, has been growing rather than declining in Iran. Can this be
explained at least partly by the fact that women's employment opportunities are
limited and women cannot rely on a steady income.
... Payvand News - 02/10/09 ... --
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