By Nader Bagherzadeh
|
Iran's Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Uranium
Enrichment for Non-Specialists
By
Nader Bagherzadeh
The primary aim of
this article is to explain Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and the uranium
based nuclear enrichment technology at the level of a
non-specialist. Familiar and rudimentary examples are used so that
interested readers can have a better understanding of this critical
and controversial technology which is at the core of the contentious
US-Iran relation.

Yellow Cake |
The neo-cons, some of the reporters from major US
newspapers, and a number of nonproliferation experts are now spinning a new
story about the potential threat of Iran's uranium enrichment capability.
According to the story, sometime in 2009, Iran will have enough Low Enriched
Uranium (LEU) which may then be used as a seed for further refinement to bomb
grade level, commonly referred to as High Enriched Uranium (HEU). LEU has the
purity of about 5% and is only used to fuel reactors for generating electricity,
but HEU has to be enriched to the 90% level and it is only good for bomb making
purposes.
This allegation has technical and
logical flaws that are not discussed by the highly biased and ignorant US
media. Centrifuges at the Natanz facility in Iran are not set up for efficient
enrichment to the level of 90%. Pipes have to be redesigned and new connections
have to be made to get the cascades ready for efficient refinement to the level
of 90% for bomb grade uranium. Moreover, the LEU product is under the strict
control of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Any change in the
cascades' configuration or tap into the accumulated LEU would be noticed by the
IAEA cameras, sensors and frequent inspections within minutes. The re-piping
efforts would take months to finish and the US decision makers would have ample
time to get the world community to support drastic measures to stop such illegal
activity.
Of course Iran could opt to use
the existing cascades without any modifications, by employing batch
processing. This is a very inefficient and time consuming method which would
also be immediately noticed by the IAEA. Batch processing means taking the 5%
product currently stored under the control of the IAEA and run it through the
existing cascades one more time. 5% fuel would produce a 20% product, and if
the 20% product was used as the feed, it would refine the uranium to the 60%
purity level. One additional refinement through the existing setup of the
centrifuges with the 60% feed would produce bomb grade fuel at the requisite 90%
purity.
The latest unofficial report on
the Natanz facility is that currently there are 5000 centrifuges running
smoothly without any major technical problems. It is reported that an
additional 1000 centrifuges are scheduled to go online sometime in January of
2009. Once all the 6000 units are working, they can enrich about 4-5 Kg of LEU
per day. Given that Iran has so far accumulated 700 Kg of LEU. It will have,
by April of this year or perhaps even sooner, close to 1000 Kg of LEU. Recall
that, in order to produce weapons grade fuel, roughly 30 Kg of LEU are needed to
yield about 1 Kg of HEU. A typical uranium bomb has 25 Kg or more of HEU
material.
The base of the story spun in the
US media is to declare the 1000 Kg LEU milestone as a point of no return for
Iran's enrichment activity. This is an arbitrary and flawed argument, because
Natanz is a safeguarded facility and any deviations will be noticed
immediately. Let's assume hypothetically that Iran embarks on an illegal
activity and relinquishes its obligations under the current safeguard agreement
and initiates illicit enrichment of purifying uranium to the level of 90%. The
spin masters are saying that this emboldens Iran to threaten Israel which
allegedly has more than 200 nuclear weapons.
Having 1000 Kg of LEU does not
increase Iran's deterrence vis-à-vis hegemony aspirations of Israel in the
Middle East. First of all, even if Iran breaks its international agreements
under IAEA and produces 25 Kg of HEU, detonating this material, although easier
than plutonium, is not an easy task. Moreover, this will be designated as a
nuclear device and not a bomb, going from a device which is considered a
laboratory prototype to a bomb requires sophisticated technologies that Iran
does not have.
Let's assume that Iran passes all
these difficult hurdles and with the help of their talented engineers develop a
miniaturized and deliverable bomb, does anyone in the right mind believe that
Iran could threaten Israel with their only bomb? Even the National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of November 2007 disagrees with the notion that
theocratic leaders of Iran take chances with their nuclear aspirations: They are
not in the business of committing suicide for the sake of helping the
Palestinian people.
The entire negative propaganda
machine is making sure that Obama will be tough on Iran and will continue the
failed Bush policy of zero enrichment. Iran has made its position clear to all
the interlocutors in recent months that have contacted the government directly
or indirectly: zero enrichment is not acceptable and is considered a redline
position for Iran that they will not cross at any cost.
The team which president-elect
Obama has selected for dealing with Iran includes Dennis Ross who has a long
history of full support for Israel's positions in the Middle East. His
one-sided position during Clinton's Arab-Israeli peace process was so noticeable
that one Arab observer said "... he listened to what Israel wanted and then
tried to sell it to the Arabs." Iranian politicians are very familiar with
Clinton's team: Indyk, Miller, Kurtzer, and Ross. By selecting such a biased
team to negotiate with Iran, Obama has taken the wrong step, giving more
ammunition to the hardliners in Iran to torpedo negotiations with these
representatives of the US government.
If Obama is serious about engaging
Iran to resolve many of the lingering differences between the two governments,
two important issues must be tackled. First and foremost, the threat of a
military action is an illegal choice and a violation of Article 2 Paragraph 4 of
UN Charter. It should not be on the table. A constitutional scholar such as
Obama should know that and respect it, but so far in many of their public
discussions Obama and Clinton have kept this illegal option on the table to
appease Israel. Second, the zero enrichment requirement cannot be the starting
point for the negotiations. Instead, how to enforce additional confidence
building measures that the IAEA has established for member countries should be
the focal point.
... Payvand News - 01/14/09 ... --