By
Dr. Trita Parsi, NIAC
Washington DC - In talking about the assault on
Gaza, neo-conservative pundits and Israeli hardliners have relied on a familiar
frame. The fighting in Gaza, they say, is a struggle between Israel and
so-called "moderate" Arab states (namely, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) on the
one hand, and Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Ha-mas on the other. In reality, Israel
is fighting Iran in Gaza, the argu-ment reads. These imagined Manichean fault
lines defy logic and reality. This conflict is the last thing Tehran would have
wished for in the last few weeks of the Bush administra-tion. It increases the
risk of a US-Iran confrontation now, and reduces the prospects for US-Iran
diplomacy once President elect Obama takes over - neither of which is in Iran's
national interest. Rather than benefiting from the instability following the
slaughter in Gaza, Iran stands to lose much from the rise in tensions. And so
does Obama.
To Iran, Hamas is no Hezbollah
While there certainly is an underlying rivalry
between Israel and Iran that has come to fuel many other otherwise unrelated
conflicts in the region, not every war Israel fights is related to Iran. In this
specific case, the parallels to the 2006 Lebanon war are inaccurate. Iran's ties
to Hamas are incomparable to the much deeper relationship Iran enjoys with
Hezbollah. Iran's close relationship with Hezbollah is rooted in the Iranian
view that Shiite minorities in Arab countries are Iran's most likely allies and
agents of pro-Iranian sentiment; consequently, backing Hezbollah is viewed to be
in Iran's core national interest. In contrast, Iran's relationship with Hamas is
a marriage of convenience at best.
In spite of its ardent pro-Palestinian rhetoric,
Iran's relationship with Palestinian groups -- including Hamas -- has often been
strained. Tensions with Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization were
mostly rooted in Arafat's insistence on defining the Israel-Palestinian conflict
as a secular Arab nationalist cause -- leaving non-Arab Iran with no opening to
play a leadership role in the Muslim world's cause célebre. Differences with
Hamas, however, derived from a mix of politics and ideology. Hamas' intellectual
roots go back to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni fundamentalist
movement. Furthermore, during the Iraq-Iran war, both the PLO and Hamas
expressed support for Saddam Hussein.
Throughout the 1980s, Iran was better at offering
rhetoric than practical support to the Palestinian cause, due to Iran's
immediate security concerns. This changed in the mid-1990s, when Iran feared
that the Oslo peace process was partially aimed at securing Iran's prolonged
isolation and political exclusion. But even after the outbreak of the second
Intifada, the Iranians took the lead in making grandiose speeches about Iranian
backing of the Palestinian cause, but seldom tried to live up to the standards
set in its statements.
European diplomats in contact with
representatives of Islamic Jihad and Hamas visiting Iran after fighting between
Israelis and Palestinians had broken out reported back that both groups were
utterly disappointed with their Iranian hosts whom they accused of making empty
promises -- Tehran neither provided them with money nor weapons. A joke in the
streets of Tehran reflected Iran's pretense: "Why aren't there any stones left
to stone the adulteress? Per the order of the Supreme Leader, all the stones
have been shipped to Palestine as Iran's contribution to the Intifada."
Again, history seems to be repeating itself.
After daily demonstrations in Tehran in favor of the Palestinians, including a
six-day sit-in at Tehran airport by hard-line students demanding government
support for sending volunteers to fight in Gaza, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei contained the protesters by thanking them - while pointing out that
Iran was not in a position to go beyond rhetorical support since "our hands are
tied in this arena." Other Iranian officials have reinforced that message.
General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps, declared that Hamas does not need military support to defend
itself. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's brother indicated to the demonstrators
at Tehran airport that Iran's support for the Palestinians would be limited to
"spiritual support for the victimized people of Gaza."
Why Israel's offensive in Gaza should
worry Obama
Tehran's complex, if not conflicted, response to
the assault on Gaza can best be understood in the context of its broader
strategic aims. By rejecting any material Iranian support or involvement in the
Gaza battles, Iran's strategic imperatives trumped its ideological concerns and
pretenses once more. Khamenei's statement regarding Iran's hands being tied
resembles Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal to support the Lebanese Shiites by
directly entering into war with Israel in 1984 through his edict that the road
to Jerusalem goes through Karbala. That is, until Iran has defeated Saddam
Hussein, it will not be sucked into a conflict with Israel, regardless of
Tehran's ideological opposition to the Jewish state.
Contrary to the neo-conservative narrative that
the fighting benefits Iran, Tehran seems to view the Israeli assault on Gaza as
highly problematic for several reasons. First, there are suspicions in Tehran
that Israel's offensive is a trap with the aim of drawing both Hezbollah and
Iran into the fighting. With only weeks left till President Elect Obama takes
office, any direct conflagration between Iran and Israel would significantly
reduce Obama's ability to deliver on his campaign promise of opening talks with
Tehran without preconditions.
Second, increased tensions and polarization in
the Middle East undermines Obama's ability to pursue a new policy towards this
region, including a shift in America's 30-year old policy of isolating Iran. In
fact, polarization along the imagined Gaza fault lines - and a misleading
equation of Hamas with Tehran - traps the incoming Obama administration in an
involuntary continuation of the Bush policies that contributed to the increased
instability in the Middle East in the first place. From the vantage point of
Israeli hardliners, this may be a welcomed outcome since it will make compromise
with Tehran more difficult and pressure on Israel less likely. Hence, Tehran
seems poised not to help reduce Obama's maneuverability.
Third, the conflict is creating unwelcome
tensions between Iran and key Arab states. Arab dictatorships fearing that the
rise of Iran would weaken America's position in the Middle East and that the
survival of Hamas would embolden Islamic nationalist opposition groups
throughout the region - both of which would undermine these Arab governments'
undemocratic rule - initially sided with Israel by remaining silent or
explicitly putting the blame on Hamas. But as the casualties rose and the images
of slaughter spread on Arab satellite TVs, the anger of the Arab streets reached
the Arab palaces and courts. A similar pattern was seen in 2006 when many Arab
governments initially welcomed Israel's air assault on Hezbollah in Lebanon.
There, the change of heart had less to do with the images of Lebanese casualties
and more to do with Hezbollah's surprising resilience and fighting power.
Though it is true that increased tensions enables
Iran to score propaganda victories on the Arab streets, since many Arab states
have either remained silent or secretly collaborated with Israel to defeat
Hamas, this does carry a great risk for Tehran. If the fighting in Gaza goes on
for too long, the spillover effects will be felt in increased Arab-Iranian
tensions at a time when Tehran is more interested in soothing ties with the
Arabs in order to minimize Arab disruption to any potential US-Iran opening.
The neo-conservative narrative and its imagined
fault lines may temporarily add fuel to the US-Israeli alliance, but it will
neither bring stability nor order to the region. Rather, it will push the Middle
East further into endless conflict and restrict America's next president to a
mindset and a policy framework that risks making the promise of change a dream
unfulfilled.
... Payvand News - 01/16/09 ... --
