By
Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, Global
Research
In the Middle East, it is widely believed that the war against Gaza is an
extension of the 2006 war against Lebanon. Without question, the war in the Gaza
Strip is a part of the same conflict.
Moreover, since the Israeli defeat in 2006, Tel Aviv and Washington have not
abandoned their design to turn Lebanon into a client state.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told France's President Nicolas Sarkozy, in so many
words, during his visit to Tel Aviv in early January that today Israel
was attacking Hamas in the Gaza Strip and that tomorrow it would be fighting
Hezbollah in Lebanon.[1]
Lebanon is still in the cross-hairs. Israel is searching for a justification or
a pretext to launch another war against Lebanon.

Washington and Tel Aviv had initially hoped to control Beirut through client
political forces in the March 14 Alliance. When it became apparent that
these political forces could not dominate Lebanon politically the Israeli
military was unleashed on Lebanon with a goal of bringing about the ultimate
downfall of Hezbollah and its political allies. [2] Areas where support for
Hezbollah and its political allies were strongest saw the harshest Israeli
attacks in 2006 as part of an attempt to reduce, if not remove, popular support
for them.
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images of Israel's attack on Lebanon in 2006 |
After the 2006 war, the second Israeli defeat in
Lebanon, Washington and Tel Aviv with the help of Jordan, the U.A.E., Egypt, and
Saudi Arabia started arming their clients in Lebanon to wield an internal armed
option against Hezbollah and its allies. In the wake of both the short-lived
internal violence between the Lebanese National Opposition and the March 14
Alliance and the Doha Accord, which was reached in Qatar on May 21, 2008 as
a result of the failure of this internal armed option against Hezbollah and its
allies, the Israeli-U.S. objective to subdue Lebanon has been dramatically
impaired.
A "national unity government" was formed in which the Lebanese National
Opposition — not just Hezbollah — hold veto power through one-third of the
cabinet chairs, including that of the post of deputy-prime minister.
The objective in Lebanon is "regime change" and to repress all forms of
political opposition. But how to bring it about? The forecast of the 2009
general-elections in Lebanon does not look favourable for the March 14
Alliance. Without an internal political or armed option in Lebanon, which
could result in the installation of a U.S.-sponsored "democracy," Washington and
its indefictible Israeli ally have chosen the only avenue available: a military
solution, another war on Lebanon. [3]
Crossing Arms III: Israel Simulates a Two-Front War against Lebanon and Syria
This war is already in the advanced planning stage. In November 2008, barely a
month before Tel Aviv started its massacre in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli
military held drills for a two-front war against Lebanon and Syria called Shiluv
Zro'ot III (Crossing Arms III).[4]
The military exercise included a massive simulated invasion of both Syria and
Lebanon. Several months before the Israeli invasion drills, Tel Aviv had
also warned Beirut that it would declare war on the whole of Lebanon and not
just Hezbollah.[5]
Israel's justification for these war preparations was that Hezbollah has grown
stronger and become a partner in the Lebanese government since the Doha Accord.
The latter was signed in Qatar between the March 14 Alliance and the
Lebanese National Opposition. It is worth noting that Hezbollah was a member of
the Lebanese coaltion government prior to the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon.
No doubt, Tel Aviv will also point to Hezbollah's support of Hamas in Gaza as
another pretext to wage under the banner of combating Islamic terrorism a
pre-emptive war on Lebanon. In this context, Dell Lee Dailey the head of the
counter-terrorism section of the U.S. State Department, had told Al-Hayat in
an interview that an Israeli attack on Lebanon was "imminent" as part of the
fight against terrorism. [6]
Blitzkrieg in the Making
Tel Aviv has been mapping a large-scale blitzkrieg against Lebanon as a
whole, which includes an immediate land invasion. [7] Just before the Israeli
massacre in the Gaza Strip started, Israeli officials and generals had promised
that no Lebanese village would be immune from the wrath of Israeli aerial
bombardments, regardless of religion, sect, and/or political orientation. [8]
In substance, Tel Aviv has promised to totally destroy Lebanon. Israel has also
confirmed that in any future war against Lebanon, the entire country rather than
Hezbollah will be the target. In practice, this was already the case in 2006's
Israeli aerial attacks on Lebanon. [9]
The Jerusalem Post quotes Brigadier-General Michael Ben-Baruch, one of
the individuals who oversaw the invasion drills, as saying, "In the last war, we
fired to disrupt Hezbollah activity," and, "The next time we will fire to
destroy." [10]
In the wake of Israel's 2006 defeat, the Israeli government admitted that its
"big mistake" was it exercised restraint rather than attacking Lebanon with the
full strength of its military. Israeli officials have intimated that in the
case of a future war against the Lebanese that all civilian and state
infrastructure will be targeted.
Beirut's New Defence Doctrine: A Threat to Israeli Interests and Objectives
to Control Lebanon
Why is Lebanon in the cross-hairs again?
The answer is geo-political and strategic. It is also related to the political
consensus process and the upcoming 2009 general-elections in Lebanon. Following
the formation of a unity government in Beirut under a new president, Michel
Suleiman (Sleiman), a new proactive defence doctrine for the country was
contemplated. The objective of this defence doctrine is to keep Israel at bay
and bring political stability and security to the country.
At the "National Defence Strategy" dialogue, held by the 14 Lebanese signatories
of the Doha Accord, all sides have agreed that Israel is a threat to Lebanon.
In the months prior to the Israeli military campaign against Gaza, important
diplomatic and political steps were taken by Beirut. President Michel Suleiman
accompanied by several cabinet ministers visited Damascus (his first bilateral
state visit; August 13-14, 2008) and Tehran (November 24-25, 2008).
In turn, General Jean Qahwaji (Kahwaji) the commander of the Lebanese Armed
Forces was also in Damascus (November 29, 2008) for consultations with his
Syrian counterpart General Al-Habib. While in Damascus, General Qahwaji also met
with General Hassan Tourkmani, the defence minister of Syria, and the Syrian
President. [11] His trip followed the visit of Lebanon's interior minister, Ziad
Baroud, to Syria and was within the same framework. [12] Meanwhile, Lebanon's
defence minister, Elias Murr, went on an official visit to Moscow (December 16,
2008).
What started to emerge from these talks was that both Moscow and Tehran would
provide weaponry to the Lebanese Armed Forces, which previously had been the
recipients of lower-end U.S. made ordinance. The U.S. has always forbidden the
Lebanese military from purchasing any heavy weapons that could challenge
Israel's military strength.
It was also revealed that Russia would donate 10 MiG-29 fighter jets to Beirut
in line with Lebanon's new defence strategy. [13] The use of the Russian MiG-29s
would also entail the required installation of early warning and radar
systems. Russian tanks, anti-tank rockets, armoured vehicles, and military
helicopters are also being sought by Lebanon. [14]

Mig29
Iran has offered to supply the Lebanese military with medium-range missiles as
part of a five-year Iranian-Lebanese defence agreement. [15] While in Iran,
Michel Suleiman held talks with Iranian defence officials and went to an Iranian
defence industry exposition.

Michel Suleiman in Tehran
While the talks with Moscow and Tehran aimed at arming the Lebanese Armed
Forces, the talks with the Syrians were geared towards establishing and
strengthening a joint security and defence framework directed against Israeli
aggression. [16]
Integrating Hezbollah into the Lebanese Armed Forces
Moreover, Michel Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement and the Reform and
Change Bloc in the Lebanese Parliament also visited Tehran (October 12-16, 2008;
ahead of Michel Suleiman's official visit), and later Damascus (December 3-7,
2008). [17] Michel Aoun who is a central figure in the "political consensus" has
endorsed and reaffirmed his political alliance with Hezbollah.

Michel Aoun and Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki
While calling for the peaceful disarmament of Hezbollah within a Lebanese
defence strategy, he has accepted that Hezbollah fighters will eventally
integrate into Lebanon's army. This disarmement process would only occur when
the time is right and Israel no longer poses a threat to Lebanon. Hezbollah has
broadly agreed to this, if and when there no longer exists an Israeli threat to
the country's security. This position on Hezbollah's arms is spelled out
in clause 10 (The Protection of Lebanon) of the February 6, 2006 memorandum of
understanding (MoU) with Hezbollah that Michel Aoun signed on behalf of his
political party, the Free Patriotic Movement.
Following his return from Tehran, Aoun also presented his case for the formation
of a new Lebanese defence strategy and promised that the outcome of his visit to
Iran would materialize in about six months. Aoun has also said that Iran, as the
"major regional power between Lebanon and China" is of strategic importance to
Lebanese interests. [18]

Hezbollah Paramilitary Forces
Washington's political cohorts in Lebanon are alarmed at the direction Lebanon
is taking under its new defence strategy. They have criticized weapons purchases
from Iran and defensive cooperation with Syria. This includes attacks on General
Jean Qahwaji's visit to Syria, which was mandated by the entire Lebanese
cabinet. [19] Additionally, within these pro-U.S. forces in Lebanon there has
been a push for a "Swiss-like" "neutral defence policy" for Lebanon within the
Middle East. Such a "neutral" position would benefit the U.S. and Israel
geo-politically and strategically. Needless to say, with the threat of Israeli
military aggression looming, this position is proving to be rather unpopular
within Lebanon.
Ending Israeli-American pressure on Beirut to Naturalize Palestinian Refugees
The formation of a new proactive defence doctrine implies that Hezbollah
fighters would be incorporated in the Lebanese Armed Forces and that the
existing paramilitary forces of Hezbollah would be disbanded once certain
conditions are met.
Therefore, one of Lebanon's key political questions would be resolved. With the
integration of Hezbollah fighters into the country's army together with military
aid from Russia and Iran, Lebanon would acquire defensive capabilities, which
would enable it to confront the threat of Israeli military aggression. These
developments, which go against the prevailing pattern of U.S. client regimes in
the Middle East modelled on Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have sounded an alarm bell
in Tel Aviv, Washington, and London.
In response to Lebanon's rapprochement with Russia and Iran, two senior US State
Department officials were rushed to Beirut in December.[20] During this mission,
Dell Lee Dailey and David Hale, respectively Coordinator of the State
Department's Office of Counterterrorism and Deputy-assistant Secretary
responsible for Middle Eastern affairs, renewed the veiled threats of an Israeli
attack against Lebanon, while casually placing the blame on Hezbollah.[21] These
threats are aimed at Lebanon as a whole. They are intended to disrupt the
creation of Lebanon's new defence doctrine.
The clock is ticking for Israel, the U.S., and NATO to obstruct the
implementation of Beirut's new national defence doctrine.
Israel would no longer have any justifications for carrying out military
incursions into Lebanon if Hezbollah were to become a full political party under
a new Lebanese defence strategy. Moreover, if Beirut were able, under a new
defence arrangement, to protect its borders against Israeli military threats it
would not only end Tel Aviv's ambitions to politically and economically dominate
Lebanon, but it would also end Israeli pressure on Lebanon to naturalize the
Palestinian war refugees waiting to return to their ancestoral lands that are
occupied by Israel.
Clearly the issue of Palestinian naturalization in Lebanon is also tied to
Lebanon's political consensus process and new defence strategy and was discussed
by Michel Suleiman with Iranian officials in Tehran. [22]
The Middle Eastern Powder Keg: A World War III Scenario?
In 2006, when Israel attacked Lebanon, the war was presented to international
public opinion as a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. In essence the 2006
war was an Israeli attack on all of Lebanon. The Beirut government failed to
take a stance, declared its "neutrality" and Lebanon's military forces were
instructed not to intervene against the Israeli invaders. The reason for this
was that the political parties of the Hariri-led March 14 Alliance that
dominated the Lebanese government were expecting the war to end quickly and for
Hezbollah (their political rival) to be defeated, and eventually excluded
from playing a meaningful role on the Lebanese domestic political scene. Exactly
the opposite has occurred since 2006.
Moreover, had the Lebanese government declared war on Israel, in response to
Israeli aggression, Syria would have been obligated through a Lebanese-Syrian
bilateral treaty, signed in 1991, to intervene in support of Lebanon.
In the case of a future Israeli war against Lebanon, the structure of military
alliances is crucial. Syria could indeed intervene on the side of Lebanon. If
Syria enters into the conflict, Damascus could seek the support of Tehran in the
context of a bilateral military cooperation agreement with Iran.
A scenario of escalation is, therefore, possible, which could potentially spin
out of control.
If Iran were to enter on the side of Lebanon and Syria in a defensive war
against Israel, the U.S. and NATO would also intervene leading us into a broader
war.
Both Iran and Syria have military cooperation agreements with Russia. Iran also
has bilateral military cooperation agreements with China. Iran is also an
observer member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Iran's allies
including Russia, China, the member states of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) could all
be drawn into the broader conflict.
NOTES
[1] 'We're fed up with empty gestures', The Jerusalem Post,
January 6, 2009.
[2] The militarization of Lebanon, extinguishing any credible armed resistance
in Lebanon to Israel, and targeting Syria were also all factors for the Israeli
attacks in 2006.
[3] It should be noted that the fighting between Hamas and Fatah and the Israeli
campaign against the Gaza Strip that started on December 27, 2008 has obstructed
the Palestinian electoral process.
[4] Amos Harel, IDF concludes large drill simulating double-front war in
North, Haaretz, November 6, 2008.
[5] Barak Ravid, Israel: Lebanon is responsable for Hezbollah's actions,
Haaretz, August 8, 2008.
[6] "Hezbollah Terrorist Group; War with Israel Imminent", Al-Manar,
December 17, 2008
[7] Yakkov Katz, Preparing for a possible confrontation with Hizbullah,
The Jerusalem Post, December 11, 2008.
[8] Andrew Wander, Top Israeli officer says Hizbullah will be destroyed in
five days 'next time', The Daily Star (Lebanon), December 17, 2008.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Yakkov Katz, Preparing for a possible, Op. cit.
[11] Ahmed Fathi Zahar et al., President al-Assad Receives General
Qahwaji, Underlines Role of Lebanese Army in Defending Lebanon's Security and
Stability, Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), November 29, 2008.
[12] Lebanese army commander pays visit to Syria, Xinhua News Agency,
November 30, 2008.
[13] Wang Yan, Russian donation of 10 Mig-29 fighters to Lebanon raises
suspicions, Xinhua News Agency, December, 17, 2008; Yoav Stern,
Russia to supply Lebanon with 10 MiG-29 fighter jets, Haaretz,
December 17, 208; Russia 'to give' Lebanon war jets, British
Broadcasting Corporation News (BBC News), December 17, 2008.
[14] Lebanon defense minister to talk arms in Moscow, Russian News and
Information Agency (RIA Novosti), December 15, 2008.
[15] Zheng E, Lebanese president requests medium weapons from Iran,
Xinhua News Agency, November 26, 2008; Kahwaji stresses LAF role, while
politicians bicker some more, The Daily Star (Lebanon), November 27,
2008; Russian donation, Op. cit.
[16] Sun, Lebanese army commander returns from Syria, Xinhua News
Agency, November 30, 2008.
[17] Sami Moubayed, Former foe a celebrity in Damascus, Gulf News,
December 4, 2008.
[18] Aoun: Iran, most powerful country, Islamic Republic News Agency
(IRNA), October 21, 2008.
[19] Lebanese ctiticizes army commander's visit to Syria [sic.],
Xinhua News Agency, December 1, 2008.
[20] More praise for Russia's promise of 'free' MiGs, Agence France-Presse
(AFP) and The Daily Star (Lebanon), December 18, 2008.
[21] War with Israel Imminent, Op. cit.; US envoy warns against
rearming Lebanon's Hezbollah, Deutsche Presse-Agentur/German Press Agency
(DPA), December 17, 2008.
[22] Kahwaji stresses LAF role, Op. cit.
Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is in an independent writer
based in Ottawa specializing in Middle Eastern and Central Asian affairs. He is
a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).
Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is a frequent contributor to Global Research. Global
Research Articles by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya
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