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Source:
U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence
A
newly published
report from the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence describes Iran's naval
order of battle, as well as the Iranian Navy's history, strategic options, and
favored tactics.
Following
is Chapter 1 of the report. Full report is available
here (pdf)
Chapter1: Brief History of Iran's Naval Forces
Iran's
naval forces, like the country itself, have been shaped by the Islamic
revolution, petroleum, and an often adversarial relationship with neighboring
countries and the international community as a whole. These factors have
influenced how Iran's naval forces are organized, how they are equipped and
manned, and how they interact with external forces.
Iran has
two naval forces: the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, or IRIN, and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, or IRGCN. The IRIN is the naval branch of Iran's
Artesh, the traditional military force that existed prior to the 1979
revolution. This force was the former Shah's Imperial Iranian Navy and was
originally designed to be a blue-water force capable of demonstrating the power
and prestige of the Shah's Iran. Today, it consists mainly of older, mid-sized
naval combatants, such as corvettes and missile-equipped patrol craft purchased
by the Shah from western nations, including the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France. The IRIN has not fully escaped the stigma of its
pre-revolution loyalties and remains secondary in most respects to the IRGCN.
The IRGCN
emerged after the Islamic revolution during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. The
revolutionary forces not only distrusted the former Shah's military, they
greatly weakened it by executing many senior commanders and conducting purges to
rid it of any loyalists to the Shah. This allowed the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC)-the Ayatollah Khomeini's base of revolutionaries turned
paramilitary internal security force-to take on a larger role in the country's
defense. In addition to the original ground forces element, the IRGC also
formalized an emerging naval component in the mid-1980s, following successful
amphibious operations in the southern marshlands of Iraq. Over the intervening
decades, the IRGCN has been politically favored over the IRIN and has
capitalized on this status to acquire advanced weaponry and better platforms to
develop additional capabilities.
Unlike many countries, Iran does not
have a long naval history. The development of Iran's naval forces was
kick-started by the discovery of Iran's petroleum deposits in the early 20th
century and the country's subsequent need to protect its maritime commerce.
However, the Shah's navy operated under the shadow of foreign forces until the
1970s when British stewardship in the Persian Gulf came to an end.
After the
British withdrawal, Iran took a larger role in protecting the Persian Gulf
sea-lanes, particularly escorting Iranian merchant ships. The Shah, awash with
oil revenue, provided a large defense budget and the promise of new equipment
with which the navy could carry out its expanding missions. In line with the
government's cooperative relationship with the West, the Shah's navy bought
frigates, destroyers, corvettes, and patrol craft and operated them largely
according to NATO doctrine. Items ordered included modified SPRUANCE-class
destroyers and diesel submarines from the United States and Germany. While some
acquisitions were necessary for the navy's mission, others were more for the
prestige that came with having one of the strongest navies in the region. So
great were the Shah's ambitions that a few western countries sought to impose
limits on the Shah's quest for regional power.
The Shah's plans
to dominate the region's waters were ultimately terminated by the Islamic
Revolution. In 1979, the Shah was deposed and the nation was transformed into
the Islamic Republic of Iran, led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Iran's
ties with the West and the defense contracts that came with them were severed,
leaving many Iranian naval aspirations unfulfilled. However, the remnants of the
Shah's Imperial Iranian Navy survived to form the core of the new Islamic
Republic of Iran Navy.
Soon
after the revolution the Iranian forces experienced their most active period.
During the Iran-Iraq War, both belligerents staged attacks against merchant
shipping in the Persian Gulf. By one estimate, 546 commercial vessels
were damaged, most of which were Kuwaiti vessels attacked by Iran. Iranian
naval the Strait forces executed hit-and-run attacks with small boats, fired
naval guns from IRIN warships, boarded commercial vessels in search of material
destined to support Iraq's war efforts, and attacked merchants using coastal
defense cruise missiles.
Iran's
use of naval mines during the war was, however, the most notable aspect of the
maritime front of the war. During the very first escort mission of re-flagged
tankers by U.S. Navy ships in July 1987, the Kuwaiti super tanker AL REKKAH,
re-flagged as the United States super tanker BRIDGETON, struck a mine. Two
months later, the United States caught the IRIN's IRAN AJR-class landing ship
IRAN AJR laying mines off the coast of Bahrain. Then in April 1988, USS SAMUEL
B. ROBERTS hit an Iranian mine, initiating the retaliatory Operation PRAYING
MANTIS by U.S. forces. This list is not all-inclusive, and many other incidents
of Iranian mine strikes occurred throughout the course of the war.
Today, Iran's naval forces protect
Iranian waters and natural resources, especially Iran's petroleum-related assets
and industries. Iranian maritime security operations guard against the smuggling
of illegal goods (especially drugs) and immigrants, and protect against the
poaching and stealing of fish in territorial waters. Additionally, Iran uses its
naval forces for political ends such as naval diplomacy and strategic messaging.
Most of all, Iranian naval forces are equipped to defend against perceived
external threats. Public statements by Iranian leaders indicate that they would
consider closing or controlling the Strait of Hormuz if provoked, thereby
cutting off almost 30 percent of the world's oil supply.
Importance of the Strait of Hormuz
The U.S.
Department of Energy estimated that in 2008 Gulf nations produced 29.8 percent
of the world's oil supply, much of which transited the Strait of Hormuz.
Additionally the Persian Gulf region produced 29.1 percent of the natural gas
for export to the world's markets. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would require
the use of overland routes to transport oil out of the Persian Gulf. Currently
the Saudi Arabia East-West Pipeline has the capacity to move five million
barrels per day to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, well short of the average
17 million barrels per day that currently transit the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran would not be immune to the
economic impact of a Strait of Hormuz closure. Iran's exports of crude oil and
petroleum products alone in 2006 accounted for 74 percent of the total value of
Iran's exports and were equal to 29 percent of the nation's gross domestic
product (GDP). By volume, roughly 87 percent of Iran's imports and 99 percent of
its exports are by sea. The vast majority of this trade transits the Strait of
Hormuz. Figure 1-1 (page 4) shows the leading countries for Iranian
imports and exports.
Closing the Strait of Hormuz would
cause Iran tremendous economic damage, and therefore Iran would probably not
undertake a closure lightly. However, given the importance of the Strait,
disrupting traffic flow or even threatening to do so may be an effective tool
for Iran.
The other Persian Gulf countries are
also dependent on trade via the Strait of Hormuz. Exports from many of these
countries consist primarily of crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) going
to world markets. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) ports of Abu Dhabi and Dubai
are the busiest in the region and account for 88 percent of the UAE's GDP. Most
UAE trade involves these Persian Gulf ports and therefore must transit the
Strait. Iraq's import dependence is less than the other countries in the region;
about 55 percent of its imports by value come over land from Syria, Turkey, and
Jordan. Figure 1-2 (page 4) shows imports/ exports for Persian Gulf countries
(other than Iran) as percentage of GDP as well as percentage of value of GDP
that transits the Strait for those countries.
The world as a whole, especially
industrialized nations, would experience a serious economic impact from a
sustained closure of the Strait of Hormuz due to greatly reduced supplies of
crude oil, petroleum products, and LNG. According to Reuters, "Any military
action in the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf would knock out oil exports from
OPEC's biggest producers, cut off the oil supply to Japan and South Korea, and
knock the booming economies of Gulf states." In 2007 the Strait of Hormuz
accommodated outbound exports of about 16 million barrels per day of crude oil
and refined petroleum products. These exports amounted to about 40 percent of
all seaborne oil exports. Most of the oil exported via the Strait goes to Asia,
the United States, and western Europe. An average of 15 large crude oil tankers
per day transited Hormuz in 2007, as well as other tankers transporting
petroleum products and LNG. Of note, about 19 percent of global LNG exports
transited the Strait outbound from Qatar and the UAE in 2007. The importance of
the Strait of Hormuz will likely continue to increase over time.
In addition to the high volume of
energy related maritime traffic, a large volume of other civilian traffic uses
the Strait on a regular basis.
... Payvand News - 11/30/09 ... --
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