By
Jeff Gates
More
than 46 years ago, President John F. Kennedy sought to preclude a nuclear arms
race in the Middle East. In June 1963, he wrote the last in a series of
insistent letters to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Those letters
sought what Israel now demands of Iran: international inspections of its nuclear
facilities. The key difference: Kennedy knew for certain that Israel,
while portraying itself a friend and ally, repeatedly lied to Kennedy about its
nuclear weapons development at the Dimona reactor in the Negev Desert.
Best
estimates point to sometime between 1962 and 1964 when Israel produced its first
weapon in what is now a vast nuclear arsenal estimated at 200-400 warheads.
Kennedy's letter to Ben-Gurion was anything but friendly. The words he chose
were drawn not from diplomacy but from the instructions that a judge gives a
jury on criminal culpability. In that brusque letter, the U.S.
commander-in-chief insisted that this purported ally prove "beyond a reasonable
doubt" that the Zionist enclave was not developing nuclear weapons.
One
day after that June 15th letter was cabled to Tel Aviv for delivery
by the U.S. ambassador, Ben-Gurion abruptly resigned citing undisclosed personal
reasons. As his resignation was announced before the letter could be physically
delivered, Jewish authors routinely claim that Kennedy's message failed to reach
Ben-Gurion. Nonsense. That interpretative gloss ignores what we now know about
Israeli operations inside serial U.S. presidencies—and about Tel Aviv's routine
intercept of White House communications.
Deprived of an Israeli government with which to negotiate, Kennedy was denied a
national security victory that may well have spared the world a problem he
foresaw almost a half-century ago. In retrospect, that Israeli conduct raises
topical questions about the ability of the U.S.—or any nation—to hold Zionist
extremists accountable.
The
Khazars vs. the Kennedys
During
this same 1962-63 period, Senator William J. Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, convened hearings on the legal status of the
American Zionist Council. The AZC received funds from the Jewish Agency, a
predecessor to the state of Israel. As a recipient of U.S. taxpayer funds, the
Jewish Agency used those funds to lobby for more funds. Under U.S. law, that
conduct required the AZC to register as a foreign agent.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy joined Fulbright in that quest. That effort was
thwarted by the Israel lobby and then by the death of President Kennedy.
Thereafter, concerns about the impact of Zionist influence on U.S. policy making
continued to grow. By 1973, Fulbright could announce with confidence: "Israel
controls the U.S. Senate." In 1974, he lost his Senate seat. [See: "How the
Israel Lobby Took Control of U.S. Foreign Policy."]
Fast-forward to today and imagine the Middle East without an enclave of
nuclear-armed Zionist extremists. The threat that Kennedy posed to Tel Aviv's
arsenal was eliminated five months after Ben-Gurion's strategically well-timed
resignation. When Vice President Lyndon Johnson was sworn in as his successor,
LBJ quickly increased the arms budget for Israel. Imagine today's Zionist
influence on U.S. policy had Fulbright and the Kennedys succeeded in requiring
that the lobby register as what it is: a foreign agent.
Following the Kennedy assassination in November 1963, Nicholas Katzenbach
replaced RFK as Attorney General. Soon thereafter, the AZC evaded registration
as it morphed into the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. AIPAC now
oversees a transnational network of pro-Israeli political operatives commonly
known as "the Israel lobby."
The
Kennedy/Fulbright risk to Zionist influence reemerged five years later when
Robert Kennedy announced his candidacy for the presidency during the height of
an unpopular war that was vastly expanded under the leadership of the Texan who
replaced his brother as president. Another Kennedy presidency posed for Tel Aviv
a two-fold threat.
First,
Robert Kennedy's peace candidacy revived the possibility that he would pursue
his brother's agenda and target Israel's nuclear arsenal in order to preclude a
nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Second, with Fulbright still wielding
influence on U.S. foreign policy, a Kennedy administration revived concerns
about restrictions on the Israel lobby.
When
this charismatic contender surged in the political polls, that threat was
eliminated June 5, 1968 at a campaign event in Los Angeles. His death at the
hand of Sirhan Sirhan, a Palestinian émigré, coincided with the first
anniversary of the Six-Day War. The assassin later cited as his motive Kennedy's
campaign pledge to provide more fighter jets to Israel.
With
that murder, the road to the presidency was cleared for Richard Nixon. When
lobbied by Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, Nixon readily agreed to endorse an
"ambiguous" status for Israel's nuclear arsenal, akin to "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell."
Special Standard for a Special Friend
Due to
its "special relationship" with the U.S., Tel Aviv remains a non-signatory to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Its Dimona facility has never been
subjected to the inspections it now seeks for Iran. But for photographs taken
inside the Dimona facility in 1986 by nuclear technician Mordecai Vanunu, that
"ambiguity" might well remain intact.
The
International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly certified that Iran is not
enriching uranium beyond the 3.5% required for nuclear energy. Tehran has agreed
to send its uranium abroad for the further enrichment required for medicine
(19.5%), a level still well below the 90% required for nuclear weapons.
In
mid-September, the U.S. intelligence agencies reported to the White House that
their assessment since the National Intelligence Estimate of November 2007
remains unchanged. They still do not believe that Iran has resumed nuclear
weapons development work
What
about Israel? What has their lobby been doing? Answer: lobbying. As during the
Kennedy era, Tel Aviv remains focused on a single goal: ensuring that its ally
and patron continues a six-decade policy ensuring that Israel is not held
accountable—for anything.
At
what cost has the U.S. acted as if the Israel lobby is not a foreign agent? The
strategic issue faced by Fulbright and the Kennedys remains unresolved: how best
can the U.S. eliminate Israeli influence as a threat to national security? Since
that fateful letter of June 1963, what has been the cost of this lobby to U.S.
interests? What costs have been imposed on others by this special relationship?
At what point will Americans say: Enough!
About the author: Jeff Gates is author of Guilt By Association, Democracy
at Risk and The Ownership Solution. See
www.criminalstate.com
... Payvand News - 10/13/09 ... --
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