By Jamsheed K. Choksy (source: RFE/RL)
Iran is well on its way to becoming a nuclear power.
Iranian officials have been loud and clear: their country's nuclear program is
not bazaar merchandise. Nothing withheld by sanction, offered in exchange, or
threatened for noncompliance has so far induced Tehran to trade.
Hence the latest angst in Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin -- this time
triggered by Iran's disclosure to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
of the construction of a plant to enrich uranium near the holy city of Qom.
Iranian officials responded, feigning puzzlement, that they were fulfilling
international treaty obligations in a timely fashion although IAEA rules (which
Iran unilaterally abrogated) require notification prior to construction.
Of course, in this age of high-tech surveillance, the U.S. government had known
of the facility's existence since shortly after construction supposedly began in
2005 -- although reports from Iran suggest that the project's inception dates to
the early 1990s and received Chinese assistance. So some, if not all, of the
intelligence agencies of other permanent members in the United Nations Security
Council (the so-called P5) knew as well.
Washington had hoped to keep the issue under wraps to serve as a test of Iran's
fulfillment of obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and
additional protocols. Then Iran jumped the gun, notifying the IAEA before
Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad addressed the UN General Assembly in New
York and before U.S. President Barack Obama could convince the UN Security
Council to adopt a sweeping nonproliferation and disarmament resolution.
United Front
Speaking in Pittsburgh at the Group of 20 summit, U.S., British, and French
leaders chided Iran for unveiling yet another nuclear complex, fearing its
endeavors would contribute to a weapons program.
Iran's president fired back that those Western statesmen would regret their
hostile words, claiming the plant would produce low-enriched uranium for
peaceful energy only. Indeed, even prior to the Obama administration disclosing
to the press that Iran had a uranium-enrichment plant at Qom, Ahmadinejad
announced that Iran would seek to purchase high-enriched uranium from the P5 --
supposedly for isotope and medical research. At the same time, Iran and
Venezuela were declaring cooperation to facilitate the latter's nascent nuclear
program within the framework of the NPT.
|

Deadly embrace? Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Iran's Mahmud Ahmadinejad at a
welcoming ceremony in Tehran in April 2009. |
Despite attempts by the P5+1 (Britain, China,
France, Russia, the United States, and Germany) to present a united front
against Iran, the French are vacillating over proposed sanctions on refined
nuclear-fuel exports to Iran as noted by French Foreign Minister Bernard
Kouchner while at the UN General Assembly. At the G20 summit, Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev went on record saying that sanctions were not the best way to
achieve results -- despite U.S. hopes that Russia was on board in the wake of
Washington's missile-shield pullback from Central Europe. A Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokeswoman indicated Beijing would not go along with the U.S.-led push
for crippling sanctions.
The West has been told that Iran "will never negotiate" over its nuclear
"rights" and that it views talks with the P5+1 as focusing on "global
challenges." Iran has repeatedly made those points amply clear -- through the
international scope of its recent negotiations-framework proposal and in
numerous public statements by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and
Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki.
Lessons Learned
So negotiators can try hard when the P5+1 talks with Iran open in Geneva on
October 1, but they are unlikely to dissuade Iran from nuclearization.
Let's also keep in mind that Iran learned well from Israel's air strike against
an Iraqi nuclear plant in 1981. Since the inception of its own nuclear program,
Tehran has taken tactical steps aimed at ensuring that military strikes would be
less than effective. By locating multiple facilities near major population
centers, Iran also placed the West in the awkward situation of potentially
endangering innocent civilians.
Moreover, the window for a limited yet truly effective first strike against
Iran's nuclear facilities closed during the waning days of George Bush's
presidency and the opening years of Bill Clinton's first presidential term.
After the mid-1990s, it was no longer possible to accomplish the West's goals
with one or two days of air strikes against an emerging nuclear program.
Now, even if its nuclear facilities are attacked and severely damaged, Iran has
the knowledge, experience, and capability to rebuild within five to 10 years.
Iran would certainly withdraw from the NPT, barring IAEA inspectors from its
reconstruction efforts. Iran could retaliate by blocking the Persian Gulf --
through which one-fifth of the world's crude oil flows. It could attempt missile
strikes against U.S. and British forces in the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and
against Israel.
Even without blocking crude-oil shipments or attacking the West and Middle East
directly, Iran could work through Hamas, Hezbollah, and even team up with
Al-Qaeda to generate much long-term conflict.
The U.S. Congress and American public are yearning to leave Iraq and
Afghanistan. The prospect of having to redouble efforts in those two places to
hold off trouble stirred up by the Iranian government, plus move additional
forces into the Persian Gulf region to safeguard oil and gas shipments, would be
most unwelcome, if not downright unacceptable.
Rearguard Action?
Ultimately, only a handful of states -- the United States, Israel, England,
France, and Germany -- are truly concerned about the negative ramifications of
Iran's nuclear capabilities. Much of the rest of the world couldn't care less.
Indeed, the Russians and Chinese actually have played major roles in aiding
Iran's atomic and missile research. As a result, Ahmadinejad's government knows
that neither crippling sanctions nor military strikes are likely; nor does
Tehran fear either will be effective.
So despite cries of outrage by some members of the P5+1, it's most likely that
the world will end up accepting Iran into the system of mutually assured
destruction (MAD). Whether Iran actually tests a nuclear weapon or not will be a
moot point -- Tehran is now too far along the way toward developing fissile
material, warhead and detonation technology, and a ballistic delivery system to
be stopped by the outside world.
A recent opinion poll indicates that many Iranians attribute advantages to
developing nuclear energy, especially as their oil reserves eventually will be
exhausted. The same data reveal most Iranians, however, do not see benefit
accruing from their country possessing an atomic arsenal. So it seems that
political change from within Iran, led by Iranians who realize that while
nuclear energy may be beneficial, nuclear weapons are not, can alter the course
that the current government in Tehran is taking both at home and abroad.
Yet the world, and especially the United States, can still learn from mistakes
made by not taking timely action to halt Iran's nuclearization. At least as
troubling as Iran's march toward atomic fission is its sharing that technology
with Hugo Chavez's government in Venezuela -- in the United State's own
neighborhood.
Resurrecting shades of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ahmadinejad, his autocratic
regime, and their allies know full well how to jerk Washington's chain. The U.S.
government could, in a worst-case scenario, live with a nuclear Iran.
But can Washington politically accept another nuclear-weapons-wielding country
in the Americas?
Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor of Iranian, Central Eurasian, Indian, and
Islamic studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at
Indiana University and a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the
U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities. The views expressed in this
commentary are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2009 RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org
... Payvand News - 09/30/09 ... --
Bookmark/Share this post with:
Delicious |
Digg |
Facebook |
Furl |
Google |
Magnolia |
Newsvine |
Reddit |
Yahoo