By
Sasan Fayazmanesh
The release of some US State Department
cables by WikiLeaks concerning US-Iran relations has made sensational
headlines in the news media. Yet, to those who follow these relations closely,
there is hardly anything that is new in these cables. Consider three revelations
that have appeared in major newspapers:
Revelation 1): The Obama Administration was not sincere
when it advocated engagement with Iran. At the same time that the administration
was publicly talking about engagement, it was privately pursuing harsh sanctions
against Iran. In other words, from the very beginning the Obama Administration
essentially continued the "carrots and sticks" policy of the Bush
Administration. This revelation appeared in many newspapers. For example, on
November 30, 2010, the Christian Science Monitor wrote: "WikiLeaks
revelations that American officials were planning to raise pressure on Iran with
more sanctions and a missile defense shield-even while President Obama was
making high-profile public overtures to Iran-are being seen in Tehran as
validation of deep skepticism from the start about Obama's effort." The same
source also adds: "Iranians and analysts alike say the leaked diplomatic cables
show a half-hearted attempt at engagement in which the US administration's 'dual
track' policy, of simultaneously applying pressure and negotiating, was
undermined by a singular focus on the pressure track and a growing assumption
that engaging Iran was pointless."
The report states that American officials expected the
"engagement" to fail. It quotes Gary Sick, "an Iran expert at Columbia
University," and a former member of the US National Security Council under
Presidents Ford and Carter, as saying: "The US undertook its engagement strategy
with Iran with the clear conviction that it would fail [while] preparing (and
disseminating in private) an alternative pressure strategy. This is the most
serious indictment of all."
It is astonishing that it has taken until now for some
major newspapers, as well as some Iran "experts," to find out about the
discrepancy between what the Obama Administration has been saying and what it
has been doing. Even before the 2008 presidential election, this
author predicted that if Barak Obama was elected president, there will be no
major change in the Bush Administration's policy of "carrots and sticks," and
that a period of "tough" or "aggressive diplomacy" will appear
before hostilities begin. The prediction was based on examining the
writings of Obama's advisors on Iran. In particular, I argued that in the case
of Obama's ascendancy to the
presidency, Dennis Ross, the former director of the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy-which is a think-tank affiliate of the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee-will be the main policy maker. After the election, in a
number of essays, such as "The
Fox Guarding the Chicken Coop:
Dennis Ross and Iran" and "The
Fourth Round of Sanctions on Iran: The End of 'Tough Diplomacy'?," I further
analyzed Ross's policy of "tough" or "aggressive diplomacy." I argued that the
aim of this policy was, from the very beginning, to go through "a series of
motions intended to create the illusion of engaging Iran, with the intention of
gaining international support for aggressive actions against Iran." How could
the media have missed all such facts that were readily available? Worse yet, how
could some Iran "experts" have missed them?
Revelation 2): The Obama Administration had offered Russia
a quid pro quo: in exchange for the US not deploying missiles in Eastern Europe,
Russia would support the fourth set of UN sanctions against Iran. This
revelation also appeared in a number of major newspapers. For example, on
November 28, 2010, David E. Sanger-who,
in the case of Iran, does the same thing that Judith Miller used to do when it
came to Iraq-and his colleagues in The New York Times wrote: The Obama
"administration maneuvered to win Russian support for sanctions. It killed a
Bush-era plan for a missile defense site in Poland-which Moscow's leaders feared
was directed at them, not Tehran-and replaced it with one floating closer to
Iran's coast. While the cables leave unclear whether there was an explicit quid
pro quo, the move seems to have paid off."
Actually, there was an explicit quid pro quo, as I will
show in a sequel to my earlier book,
The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment.
But for the time being, it is sufficient to say that in a June 10, 2010 essay,
"The
Fourth Round of Sanctions on Iran: The End of 'Tough Diplomacy'?," I
actually referred to this quid pro quo. I even pinpointed the date when this tit
for tat was first proposed: "In the July 2009 G8 meeting in L'Aquila, Italy,
Obama, accompanied by Michael McFaul, the neoconservative Hoover Institute
'expert' on Russia and Iran, offered the Russians a
quid pro quo: in exchange for a deal on the expiring 1991 Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty and postponing the US deployment of anti-missile system in
Europe, Russia would agree to impose harsher sanctions against Iran. In
September of 2009 the Obama Administration sweetened the deal by promising to
drop the deployment of anti-missile system in Europe altogether. As far as the
fourth UNSC sanction resolution was concerned, the fate of Iran was nearly
sealed." I based my contention not on any secret documents, but on a series of
reports that were made available by such sources as AP, AFP, Reuters and UPI.
These same sources were available to the popular news media, such as The New
York Times. The fact that the documents leaked by WikiLeaks appear as
revelations to certain news media shows how shallow, if not purely ideological,
their reporting is.
Revelation 3): The US allies in the Persian Gulf, such as
Saudi Arabia, were worried about Iran's nuclear program and were offering oil to
China, if China agreed to support the fourth set of UN sanctions against Iran.
Again, this news appears in a number of major newspapers as a revelation,
including the above mentioned report by David Sanger and his colleagues in
The New York Times. They write: "There is also an American-inspired plan to
get the Saudis to offer China a steady oil supply, to wean it from energy
dependence on Iran. The Saudis agreed, and insisted on ironclad commitments from
Beijing to join in sanctions against Tehran. . . Publicly, these Arab states
held their tongues, for fear of a domestic uproar and the retributions of a
powerful neighbor. Privately, they clamored for strong action-by someone else."
Once more, it is hard to believe that reporters
who regularly write about Iran, such as
David Sanger, did not know what was going on
between the US and its client states in the Persian Gulf as far as Iran was
concerned. Actually, on April 12, 2010,
the same David Sanger, along with a
colleague, wrote in The New York Times:
"the Obama administration, in hopes of winning over Beijing, has sought
support from other oil producers to reassure China of its oil supply. Last year,
it dispatched a senior White House adviser on Iran, Dennis B. Ross, to Saudi
Arabia to seek a guarantee that it would help supply China's needs, in the event
of an Iranian cutoff."
This trip was, indeed, very much in accord with Dennis
Ross's own policy of "tough diplomacy." According to this policy, the US would
exert pressure on its client states in the Persian Gulf so that they would
distance themselves from Iran and get behind Israel. Before becoming president,
Barak Obama stated this policy in a
speech delivered at the 2007 AIPAC conference (the speech was
actually written by Dennis Ross, James B. Steinberg, who is currently the Deputy
Secretary of State, and former American Ambassador to Israel Daniel Kurtzer).
Obama stated: We have "to
persuade other nations, such as Saudi Arabia, to recognize common interests with
Israel in dealing with Iran." Once Obama became president, this policy was
enforced vigorously.
Beside Dennis Ross, many other members of the Obama
Administration have been traveling regularly to the Persian Gulf region to tell
the client states to get in line behind the US-Israeli policy of containing
Iran. For example, as I pointed out in
my June 10, 2010 essay, Jeffery Bader, a
colleague of Dennis Ross, accompanied him in his trip to Saudi Arabia
on November 26, 2009 (The Washington Post). Actually,
Secretary of State Clinton made at least one trip to the Persian Gulf Arab
states to persuade them to guarantee exporting oil to China in exchange for the
Chinese vote in support of the fourth round of UN sanctions against Iran. On
February 14, 2009, AFP reported: "Secretary of State Hillary Clinton flew
to the Gulf on Sunday to seek oil-rich Saudi Arabia's
help in pressing China to join the US drive for
sanctions against Iran." One
of her aids, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Jeffrey
Feltman, was quoted as saying: "Saudi Arabia has an important trading
relationship with China already. . . We would expect them (the Saudis) to use
these visits [by various US officials], to use their relationship in ways that
can help increase the pressure that Iran feels."
The pressure tactics succeeded and, as this author observed
in the above mentioned essay, after many direct trips to China by the likes of
Dennis Ross, Jeffrey Bader, James Steinberg, and even Obama himself, China
agreed to go along with the fourth set of UN sanctions against Iran. How could
such information that has been reported by many news sources, including The
New York Times itself, be viewed as revelations?
When it comes to Iran, the US State
Department cables, released by WikiLeaks, are important in so far as they
confirm what we already know. They are also tantalizing if one likes gossip or
is interested in the "he said/she said" aspect of these cables. But, as far as
substance is concerned, there is hardly anything in these documents that one can
consider to be a revelation. Much of what appears in the news media as
sensational stories concerning US-Iran relations, presumably revealed by
WikiLeaks, were readily available online through major electronic news sources.
It is in the nature of corporate news media to make a mountain out of a
molehill, to make sensational what is old news. The more sensational the news,
the more profit they can make.
... Payvand News - 12/06/10 ... --